Interview with Yang Zhou, Founder of Bebao Financial: The Rise and Fall of a $7 Billion Crypto Lending Empire
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Interview with Yang Zhou, Founder of Bebao Financial: The Rise and Fall of a $7 Billion Crypto Lending Empire
Yang Zhou opens up in a public program for the first time in years, offering readers a more multidimensional portrait of Yang Zhou and the untold story behind PayPal at that time.
Navigating Web3 tides with focused insightsOriginal author: Bill Qian
Bill: Hello everyone, welcome to Bill It Up. This week's guest is Flex Yang Zhou. His vision is to make finance accessible to everyone globally. He has successfully founded Standard Financial Inclusion, a consumer lending company; Beibao Financial, the dominant Web3 lending giant in the last cycle; and now Stables Labs, a stablecoin company. Yang Zhou, hello and welcome to our show!
Yang Zhou: Thank you, Bill, for having me.
Bill: We've actually known each other for a long time. I remember when we first met, I was still at JD.com and you were running Beibao. In the previous cycle, Beibao reached great success during its 1.0 phase. Could you share with us some highlights from Beibao’s peak?
Yang Zhou: Beibao peaked around March and April of 2021. That was right at the top of the previous Bitcoin bull market, and Coinbase’s IPO pushed market sentiment to a climax. Bitcoin briefly rose to about $64,000 in April, and funding fees and arbitrage trading heated up significantly. At that time, Beibao’s total assets under management, including lending, reached approximately $7 billion.
Bill: Seven billion dollars—larger than Pantera’s AUM today.
Yang Zhou: Yes. Actually, centralized lending institutions have consistently been larger than decentralized ones. Back then, excluding opaque cases like Tether, Genesis was the largest publicly disclosed player at around $13.8 billion—far exceeding the size of DeFi lending protocols like Aave today. The core reason lies in different customer bases. For example, we primarily served large miners in Asia. After Bitcoin surged from over $3,000 to more than $60,000, we observed miners’ assets increasing by 23 times. Suddenly, there were miners whose operations grew from initial scales of one or two hundred million dollars to four or five billion. These were representative figures in Asia. In the U.S., Genesis scaled so big largely due to GBTC arbitrage trades. From 2018 to early 2021, GBTC consistently traded at a premium, creating a strong driver: many people borrowed BTC from Genesis to subscribe to GBTC, faced a six-month lock-up period, and simultaneously sold BTC on the spot market.
Bill: You just mentioned GBTC’s six-month lock-up and arbitrage—that was a major lending scenario for Genesis back then.
Yang Zhou: Right, it was the main driver.
Additionally, Genesis needed BTC supply because it had massive USD deposits from clients. So they lent USD to Asian institutions like ours, and we supplied them with BTC, forming a large closed loop where both sides benefited. As Bitcoin prices rapidly rose, the scale kept growing.
Bill: So essentially, you and Genesis represented East and West, doing a kind of “swipe,” satisfying each other’s needs.
Yang Zhou: Exactly. The core dynamic was: Asians needed USD, which Genesis had; Genesis’s clients needed BTC, which we could provide. It was a perfect match, so the scale grew very quickly. However, this growth was driven more by industry beta—the rise of Bitcoin prices—rather than organic expansion. Since Bitcoin’s new supply is limited, a sharp price increase naturally amplifies the entire lending market.
Bill: Got it. Based on that, I understand Beibao later moved into proprietary trading, which also became a source of risk later, right? Can you talk about that?
Yang Zhou: Yes, Beibao went through roughly three stages.
The first stage was pure lending: miners pledged BTC, and Beibao lent them stablecoins. That phase was relatively clean. But after November 2020, as the market surged, customers started asking for something new—they didn’t just want loans, but BTC-denominated or ETH-denominated wealth management products. The problem was that pure lending couldn’t meet that demand. For example, BTC lending yields might only be a few basis points annually, and ETH lending rates were roughly equivalent to staking yields, around 3%-4%. That wasn’t attractive enough. So we began using options to solve the yield issue—creating positions for clients, such as selling calls or puts, to generate BTC- or ETH-based returns. In effect, Beibao bundled lending, asset management, and proprietary trading together. Of course, this was constrained by the market context. At the time, the whole industry operated without regulation, so lending firms didn’t feel the need to strictly separate lending, trading, and proprietary activities. Everyone was doing it all-in-one.
Bill: But regarding this “mixing,” I understand Wall Street still “mixes” today. Maybe what you mean is that during this mixing, risk controls were loosened, right?
Yang Zhou: Yes, though Wall Street’s “mixing” follows a cyclical pattern. Initially, everything is mixed. After risks emerge, regulators force separation. Later, when capital efficiency drops, financial institutions lobby regulators, gradually reopening and recombining. Then risks reappear, leading to another split—repeating the cycle.
Traditional finance cycles are longer than those in blockchain or crypto. Over the past century, traditional finance experienced about seven or eight such risk events. In contrast, crypto cycles are much shorter—every four years, sometimes even every two or three. Crypto moves at about a quarter of the pace of traditional finance. What takes 100 years in traditional finance, crypto completes in 20.
So at that time, “mixing” was common—even Genesis and Three Arrows did it. Only after the last cycle’s crisis did people gradually start “splitting.” It’s a cyclical process.
Bill: What specific position risks caused Beibao to eventually blow up?
Yang Zhou: You can’t look at it solely from Beibao’s perspective. Tracing back, the root of all 2022 risks actually began with high fees in early 2021.
Bill: Sorry, which high fee exactly do you mean?
Yang Zhou: I’m referring to funding fee arbitrage in the crypto market, where “risk-free” arbitrage yields reached 40%-50% annualized. In late 2020, USDT supply was about $20 billion; by April-May 2021, it had grown to over $60 billion—tripling quickly as capital flooded in for arbitrage. And this wasn’t short-term money. Fund managers, intermediaries, brokers promised clients product terms of one to two years. After another boost in July-August 2021, these funds became even more committed. So when the market turned bearish in Q4 2021, the money didn’t exit immediately.
Then the Fed truly entered a tightening cycle, and things got interesting. These funds couldn’t leave—they didn’t want to off-ramp. I’d promised two-year management periods and needed to collect full fees. Where did this capital go? They sought new outlets, one major destination being Terra’s Anchor Protocol (UST/Luna). Terra’s scale grew rapidly, and we noticed Luna’s market cap began rising sharply in Q4 2021. Originally, the Terra/Luna mechanism could hold when small, but as more capital poured in, risks accumulated significantly.
Some institutions spotted the danger by February-March 2022. Terra then loudly announced plans to buy large amounts of Bitcoin, briefly fueling a “mini spring rally” and raising market hopes. Yet, flaws in Terra/Luna were eventually detected by certain players who began attacking it. As we know, in May 2022, Terra collapsed within three days: UST lost $20 billion, Luna vanished, wiping out $40–50 billion in M0—base currency supply—across crypto. With a money multiplier of about 30x at the time, the entire market lost roughly $600 billion in value. Who stepped in to “catch the fall”? Alameda from FTX. As a market maker accustomed to not hedging, it profited from long-term pump-and-dump strategies. But this time, facing zero, it absorbed liquidity fleeing Terra and became the biggest buyer.
Bill: So catching the fall meant going to zero—it bore the greatest loss.
Yang Zhou: Yes, Alameda may have lost $10–20 billion then. But as a centralized entity, it could conceal losses, so it didn’t surface immediately. However, the shockwaves from Terra’s collapse quickly spread to 3AC, Beibao, BlockFi, and other centralized lenders.
Bill: How did this transmission work?
Yang Zhou: Because there weren’t many centralized institutions offering lending. Those willing to pay 7%-8% high interest mostly channeled funds directly or indirectly into Terra’s Anchor Protocol.
Bill: So your borrowers were essentially investing in Terra?
Yang Zhou: Yes, directly or indirectly connected. As a result, Terra’s collapse exposed nearly all centralized lending firms to massive risk.
Bill: Wait—if in the previous bull market, your borrowers were no longer miners borrowing for reinvestment, but instead many people borrowing from you to invest directly or indirectly in Luna?
Yang Zhou: Correct. Miners actually began deleveraging after December 2020. As BTC climbed from $20k to $30k to $40k, they steadily reduced leverage.
Bill: Miners are quite risk-aware.
Yang Zhou: Yes, miners have strong risk awareness—they’ve lived through many cycles. Even now, with Bitcoin stuck below $100k, an interesting reason is that miners keep selling at $100k. Many miners I know set their deleverage point at $100k—once reached, they start selling. So getting stuck at $40k last cycle and now at $100k shows similar dynamics.
Thus, miner demand had already declined in the last cycle. Main lending demand came from arbitrage and speculation, such as funding rate arbitrage. Over half of Beibao’s loan portfolio flowed into such “margin trading.” Clients borrowed from us at fixed rates and used trading strategies to seek higher returns to cover interest. So lending exposure shifted from miners’ real production needs to arbitrage and speculation—this was how risks gradually built up.
Bill: When Terra failed, your borrowers’ front-end investments disappeared. What were the downstream ripple effects?
Yang Zhou: Initially, ripple effects weren’t obvious. First came a chain of liquidations triggered by the crash. The first to fall was Three Arrows, followed by Beibao, then BlockFi. In this downturn, Three Arrows and Beibao suffered the most. Both were major option takers—key short volatility players in the market.
Bill: Both sold puts.
Yang Zhou: Yes, they sold both puts and calls, but profits from call sales couldn’t offset put losses. At that time, the so-called DDH (Dynamic Delta Hedge) across the market stopped working—you couldn’t sell. The market dropped 40% in days from $35,000 to below $20,000. Hedging models completely failed—dynamic hedging became impossible, positions couldn’t align. At that point, major option takers in the industry simply couldn’t withstand it.
Bill: So selling puts was mainly for profit, not backed by real cash ready to buy the dip. When the crash came, buying the dip was impossible.
Yang Zhou: Right. If the 40% drop happened over two or three weeks, it might’ve been manageable. But crashing in two or three days led to mutual trampling.
When you fall, some institutions rush to hedge—like those who sold puts needing to short perpetuals, futures, or BTC. Any method to hedge short adds downward pressure, accelerating the market sell-off.
Recently, during Bitcoin’s rise, we saw Gamma Squeeze—many options market makers or takers had to buy more as price rose to hedge risk, causing rapid rallies. Similarly, during declines, the same thing happens. So internal games among institutions led to similar positions—whichever sold first survived, but ultimately all died together. Everyone tried selling, but the market fell too fast. None could hedge in time—gone. Three Arrows, Beibao, even Amber were severely hit. Amber survived only because a major shareholder stepped in for debt restructuring.
Bill: Who collapsed first between you and Three Arrows—was it sequential or simultaneous?
Yang Zhou: Almost simultaneous, but Three Arrows gave up first, cutting losses decisively. Su Zhu took a trader’s view—once over, it’s over, lose and cut. Beibao tried fundraising to save itself, but ultimately failed. Both had numerous counterparties. Once trouble emerged, credit risk spread widely, triggering margin calls from most counterparties. Three Arrows reportedly declared bankruptcy outright: “I’m done.” But Beibao was still trying—still attempting to raise funds—but eventually couldn’t.
Bill: This was already June or July 2022, right?
Yang Zhou: Yes, June and July. Risks quickly spread to BlockFi and Voyager. Here’s the twist: these Western firms had previously lent to FTX or Alameda. So FTX and Alameda suddenly jumped in saying: “We’ll save them.” Why? Because they didn’t want their massive exposures revealed. But then CZ questioned them on Twitter, fully exposing the situation. Had SBF acted like OKX and suspended withdrawals, maybe they could’ve delayed collapse. But history has no ifs—he chose to fight head-on, ending instantly.
Bill: Yes, history can’t be rewritten. Feels like Sam, aside from ethics, just “ran out of breath.” If he’d held on a bit longer, maybe he’d have made it.
Yang Zhou: Exactly. If, say, the Democrats he funded had found special ways to inject capital—as with traditional finance, where central banks or treasuries rescue institutions deemed “too big to fail”—it might’ve worked. But to them, FTX was just a “cash cow,” and they didn’t grasp its potential societal impact. Result: once FTX fell, Genesis couldn’t catch its breath either. Genesis had a $13.8 billion balance sheet—the industry’s largest counterparty. Once it fell, almost every lender collapsed, except Tether.
Bill: $13.8 billion—did its funding mainly come from Tether?
Yang Zhou: No. Genesis’s funding sources were diverse, including significant non-crypto money—another unique aspect, spreading risk into traditional finance. This indirectly caused several U.S. crypto banks to fail in 2023. But those failures weren’t directly due to crypto risk—they were political. The Democratic administration ordered these banks shut, not due to internal risk. Frankly, it was “lawless.” I believe Democrats urgently wanted to distance themselves from FTX, given its donations, so they panicked and acted rashly.
Meanwhile, SVB (Silicon Valley Bank) blew up—not due to crypto. Its problem was soaring interest rates collapsing long-term bond values, causing a run. The crypto impact? USDC depegged—dropped 10% in late March 2023.
Bill: Can you explain why SVB’s asset-side decline caused USDC to depeg?
Yang Zhou: Because at the time, about 10% of USDC’s funds were held at SVB—and not as custody, but as deposits.
USDC funds at SVB were deposits, not custodied assets. Once SVB failed, 10% of reserves became inaccessible—market panic ensued. But the Fed intervened, instantly printing $500 billion into the banking system, resolving it. That $500 billion dwarfs crypto—right? But here’s the difference: traditional finance has a central bank backstop; crypto doesn’t.
If Tether had stepped in to save FTX, it might’ve contained things. But Tether is fundamentally a private entity, not public, and lacks incentive.
Bill: Hmm, so last cycle, crypto was still too small, too niche. If it were bigger, it’d be “steal a hook and get executed; steal a country and become a lord.”
Yang Zhou: Yes, you summarized perfectly. Financial crime is a serious offense in the U.S., yet history’s biggest fraud was the 2008 CDS scandal—fake loans, repackaged repeatedly, insured multiple times, rated triple-A, then invested by institutions—fraud throughout. But it was too big—no one went to jail.
Have you seen the movie Big Short? Its final scene conveys the same idea—what happened to those criminals? Nothing. So U.S. politics, or global politics, face the same issue. But now the U.S. is learning anti-corruption from China, using “anti-corruption” against political rivals. China learns AI from the U.S., creates DeepSeek; the U.S. learns China’s anti-corruption—quite interesting.
Back to point—crypto was just too small then, not worth saving.
Bill: Last cycle, from Beibao to FTX, do you think the same logic will repeat this cycle? Will systemic risks return?
Yang Zhou: I think this cycle will be much better. Lessons from last cycle drove massive improvements in risk control. First, virtually all crypto firms now use custody. Binance has Ceffu—despite affiliations, people feel far more comfortable, at least it’s off Binance’s balance sheet. OKX partnered with multiple custodians—so have others. This first step is huge progress. Traditional finance took decades to move from mixed to separated operations; crypto achieved it in two years.
This is what I find fascinating, encouraging, lovable about the industry—its speed of evolution. Despite much speculation, it keeps moving forward, iterating constantly. This drive comes from young people—we don’t assume traditional finance is superior.
Bill: Yes. But when Beibao collapsed last cycle, you were already retired, left Beibao. Why did you later return, take charge, and try to save the company?
Yang Zhou: Many asked this. Most react: “You must have dirt too—why else come back?” Honestly, I had no dirt. Answering this is peculiar—I think it reflects my personality. At the time, I felt it was the right choice—to see if anything could be salvaged.
But I couldn’t foresee, or due to historical limitations, the extent to which Luna/Terra’s collapse would impact FTX/Alameda. I didn’t expect the contagion to spread beyond 3AC and Beibao. Naively, I attempted a rescue restructuring. At the time, Beibao still held about 15,000+ BTC, tens of thousands of ETH, and ~$200M USD at Genesis—so I believed recovery possible.
Bill: You earned wide industry respect through this process, regardless of outcome.
Yang Zhou: Mixed results. Can’t claim all praise—there’s plenty of criticism too.
When Genesis fell, those 15,000+ BTC, tens of thousands of ETH, and $200M vanished. Once unrecoverable, hope ended—it was impossible. But I insisted on completing the restructuring, keeping a sliver of hope. Honestly, just to leave creditors a chance—maybe someday I recover something? An ugly saying: “Anyone claiming altruism is usually extremely selfish.” But I genuinely believe I was somewhat altruistic. Sam claimed altruism too—ultimately proved most selfish.
Bill: Right—when someone says “altruism,” they’re likely about to wield the scythe, right?
Yang Zhou: Yes, yes. But here I still say, I did have some altruistic mindset. If I ever succeed big, I will repay.
Bill: So effectively, you wrote a call option for your investors and clients.
Yang Zhou: Yes, a kind of debt option.
Bill: Since 2022–2023, you’ve started a new chapter. Your stablecoin is now ranked ninth globally. I’d like to discuss stablecoins. To me, they fall into three types: payment, trading pairs, and wealth management. Some combine one or two functions. Can you introduce your stablecoin’s features?
Yang Zhou: Stablecoins indeed come in three types: payment, trading, and wealth management. I believe their ultimate destiny is payment. But entry paths differ—some start from wealth management, others from trading.
For example, DAI in DeFi is a trading-focused stablecoin, created initially to smooth DeFi trading. As it evolved, Maker behind DAI progressed—from holding USDC reserves to gradually adding T-Bills—turning DAI into a yield-bearing stablecoin. We lack DAI’s history and contributions, making a trading entry difficult. Another trading stablecoin, BUSD by Paxos, was halted due to regulation. Later, FDUSD launched in Hong Kong, combining trading and wealth management: zero fees on Binance encourage trading; staking in Launchpool encourages yield-seeking. Ordinary projects without major platform backing typically start with “pure wealth management.” Like Terra last cycle, or projects between cycles—all yield-driven. This cycle makes it clearer: USDe by Ethena, our USDX, USD0 by USUAL—all emphasize wealth management. But I believe for most stablecoins, wealth management is merely a market entry tactic, not the endgame. Ultimately, all aim for payment.
For platforms like ours, the positioning is clear: start with wealth management. Combine CeFi, DeFi, even TradFi RWA yields into a stablecoin. As liquidity improves, exchanges accept it as collateral, enabling entry into trading. With further liquidity, it may enter payment scenarios. So I believe payment is the ultimate goal for all stablecoins.
Bill: Take USDT as an example. In global payments, roughly how much volume occurs outside crypto contexts?
Yang Zhou: From a payment perspective, USDT is already quite semi-mainstream. Especially in recent years, as the U.S. tightened AML and sanctions—particularly after the Russia incident—USDT has become nearly mainstream, allowing people to bypass U.S. sanctions. The U.S. is a superpower with rule-making power. But are all rules correct? Is sanctioning ordinary Russians right? Now U.S. sanctions on China grow—many SOEs already listed, unable to use USD. Might DeepSeek, TikTok, or Toutiao face sanctions? Entirely possible. So I believe stablecoin payments will grow increasingly mainstream. Especially in Asia—Hong Kong, Singapore—where regulated, compliant stablecoins are being promoted, preparing for the future. Historically, the earliest and most successful “stablecoin” was the familiar HKD.
Bill: How so?
Yang Zhou: HKD has been pegged to USD since 1983. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority holds U.S. Treasuries (long and short-term), issues HKD, distributed by HSBC, Bank of China, and Standard Chartered. So some HKD notes bear HSBC logos, others BOC or SCB—essentially bank-issued bills, not legal tender. Strictly speaking, the HKD we use daily is basically “USDT”—a certificate issued by Tether.
Bill: So essentially, commercial banks minted these bills?
Yang Zhou: Yes, they mint from HKMA and distribute to the market. HKMA rarely issues directly—only the 10-HKD note is issued by HKMA, the sole “legal tender.” All 20, 50, 100 notes are commercial bank bills. So HKD is essentially the longest-running, most stable USD-pegged stablecoin—over 40 years—with a scale far exceeding Tether (Tether was $130B at our talk, now over $150B)—HKD exceeds $500B. Though Tether grows fast—might surpass HKD by cycle’s end.
Bill: Next year or the year after?
Yang Zhou: Yes, possibly.
Bill: So you’re saying HKD is essentially minted “paper tokens”—a stable paper token of USD.
Yang Zhou: Yes, fundamentally a dollar-backed stablecoin. So HKD is for payments. Historically, demand exists to pay with non-USD instruments—mainly to avoid U.S. arbitrary regulations. USD dominates globally—not just due to U.S. government credibility, but because the world’s best assets—Nasdaq, Treasuries, NYSE stocks—are priced in USD. Thus, global financial institutions and banks need USD licenses to operate. This creates a powerful constraint—obtaining a USD license means complying with U.S. standards. If the U.S. labels Iran bad, you can’t do business; Venezuela bad—same. In my view, sanctioning human traffickers or drug dealers is justified. But sanctioning ordinary people—Russians can’t even use Visa cards to shop—is inhumane.
This excessive use of power is overly aggressive. Such dominance drives more people away from Swift. Using Swift isn’t just slow—it requires JPMorgan or other correspondent banks, who can block or audit transactions. So even if USD remains the pricing currency, stablecoins will become a core alternative in payments.
Bill: I really like what you just said. Can we still use USD for pricing? Like Rome’s gone, but road widths worldwide still follow Roman standards—some things endure. So America, as an empire, may see many systems fail, but its currency—the dollar—as a unit of account in users’ minds, will persist. Creating new assets on-chain, this “dollar unit” mentality might last a long time.
Yang Zhou: Exactly. You don’t need Swift, but the “dollar unit” persists. Your Roman analogy is spot-on. Also critical: lower user barriers. Create a “Venezuelan bolívar” stablecoin—no one dares use it. Use RMB—people aren’t ready yet. Maybe in ten years, when our nation becomes great again—“Make China Great Again”—people might adopt it. But now, few readily accept RMB. Euro? Always falls short. So pricing in USD is most direct and simple. Not because we worship USD, but because it’s the status quo. Building a good product means lowering barriers. Don’t challenge user mindset. Change will come eventually, but not now. But Swift? Now is the time. Stop using Swift—use blockchain. That’s a clear, solid answer: replace Swift.
Bill: So we retain USD’s mental model but reshape the international order—a new blockchain-based payment system. One last question: What’s your take on AI in Web3? Do you think it’s legitimate, or are most just using it as a cover to launch tokens?
Yang Zhou: Currently, most are indeed using it as a cover to launch tokens. But I don’t mind. What I see more is many genuinely trying to use AI to enhance crypto. Crypto and AI complement each other. Crypto is inherently a codified system—a code-driven world. Terms like DeFi or smart contract “smart” aren’t for humans, but for computers. So for AI agents that natively use code, DeFi is a natural fit.
I believe AI brings two fundamental changes: First, improved user experience. Blockchain isn’t designed for humans—it’s for bots. For AI, “using the chain” is as natural as browsing the web. Before Netscape, the internet was niche and technical; crypto today is at that stage. You need to understand Ethereum, Solana, have technical skills. Only ambitious young people like us push through. But for ordinary users, these barriers are meaningless. AI agents, like Netscape browsers, will democratize crypto. Just tell AI: “Buy some Ethereum” or “Find the highest-yielding DeFi product and invest.” AI handles transaction creation, routing quotes, risk checks—you just approve: “Sign.” Done. This transforms user demographics. Previously, our users were all “Trump traders” or “CZ dog traders.” But soon, even low-risk users like my mom can join. New users bring liquidity. Second, financial system transformation. Traditional finance struggles to use public AI—systems are too outdated. 1990s architecture, messy client data—can’t even run Excel, let alone AI. But on public chains with open ledgers like Solana, AI can directly interact with assets. Future fund managers, advisors can be AI. Two models may emerge: “one for all”—one AI serving everyone; “all for one”—many AIs serving one person. Your master AI orchestrates others, managing asset allocation, portfolio investment, even operating like a FoF. This revolutionizes finance. BlackRock now manages trillions with thousands of staff; in the future, dozens could manage tens of trillions. Profit margins soar. That’s why Larry Fink pushes AI—he sees the opportunity: replace humans with AI, inject knowledge into machines, cut costs, boost efficiency. Ultimately, human intermediaries give way to AI intermediaries. AI isn’t just cost-saving—it’s a new value creator.
So I often say: the new New York isn’t in New York—it’s on-chain.
Bill: Yes, becoming an internet capital market, an open market. All finance runs atop it.
Yang Zhou: Exactly. As AI advances, today’s logistics and warehouses rely on humans; tomorrow, AI takes over. Fraud risks plummet. This makes traditional assets easier to tokenize. Meaning crypto finally escapes the “four-year cycle” curse—no longer one year active, three years idle. The so-called “eternal bull market” isn’t Bitcoin’s bull—it’s blockchain’s bull.
Bill: Your point reminds me of something else. We always say blockchain, as a new internet, still has low active users. Binance has ~250M registered users; active individuals on-chain number in millions. But with mass applications, perhaps all internet users will eventually go on-chain—5 billion users. Even 50 billion, 100 billion AI agents could be active on-chain.
Yang Zhou: Exactly. So I believe crypto and blockchain will surpass traditional finance—simply because there will be more users. Early signs already exist—TON, Telegram host many bots. Still primitive now, but future trends are crystal clear.
Bill: Brilliant insights. Thanks for sharing. Let’s wrap here for today. Hope you can visit again next time.
Yang Zhou: Sure, thank you Bill.
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