Wintermute CEO's statement: Market makers aren't the new "villains"—people just need someone to blame
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Wintermute CEO's statement: Market makers aren't the new "villains"—people just need someone to blame
"Often people just want someone to blame, rather than deeply understanding the mechanisms of market structure and how liquidity works."
Navigating Web3 tides with focused insightsCompiled & Translated: TechFlow
Guest:
Evgeny Gaevoy, Founder and CEO of Wintermute
Hosts:
Haseeb Qureshi, Managing Partner at Dragonfly
Robert Leshner, CEO and Co-founder of Superstate
Tom Schmidt, Partner at Dragonfly
Podcast Source: Unchained
Original Title: Crypto Market Makers EXPOSED: Inside the $38M Move Token Dump - The Chopping Block
Air Date: May 11, 2025
Key Takeaways
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$38 Million Token Dump Exposed: The deal between Movement Labs and Web3 Port reveals the dark side of crypto market making.
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Market Makers or Exit Liquidity? — Deep dive into an incentive structure allowing market makers to dump tokens and share profits with foundations.
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Venture Capital Looks Away — Why top investors backed Movement Labs despite obvious risks, and what this means for due diligence in crypto.
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Rushi Fired — Movement Labs’ CEO was ousted after weeks of denial—was he alone in this?
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Wintermute’s Evgeny Speaks Up — As one of crypto’s largest market makers, Evgeny shares insights on shady deals, dumping mechanisms, and transparency failures.
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Airdrops, Market Manipulation, and Retail Losses — We unpack how token launches are manipulated behind the scenes and who ultimately bears the losses.
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The Need for Disclosure — Haseeb argues that crypto markets need mandatory disclosure of market-making agreements to avoid regulatory overreach.
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Self-Regulation or SEC Intervention? — Can the industry fix itself, or are we headed toward another wave of securities enforcement?
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Crypto’s Trust Crisis — Lack of transparency could collapse the entire token model. This episode explores how to fix it.
Notable Quotes Summary
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We want retail investors to lose as little as possible.
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I believe disclosure is ultimately very beneficial for market makers. It helps normalize the market by creating standards.
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Often people just want someone to blame, rather than understand market structure and liquidity mechanics.
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For a market maker, the incentive must be strong enough to push the price up and then cash out afterward.
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Sometimes, if you're not deep in the crypto circle or lack referrals, it's hard to tell who has good reputation and who doesn’t.
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We have competitors across DeFi, centralized exchanges, venture capital, and decentralized market making—but only a few market makers can cover all these areas.
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In my ideal world, the information gap between exchanges and retail investors should be nearly zero. When you apply for listing, public knowledge should match what the exchange knows.
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We can choose to disclose and be accountable to investors, or stay silent because we don’t want criticism. That’s where our industry stands today: no disclosure, but if you do disclose, you get attacked.
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There are three effective channels to standardize disclosure. First, through exchanges. Second, through venture capital firms. Third, through market makers themselves.
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If we proactively create a disclosure regime that works for us, it benefits the industry more.
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As an industry, we need to mature and address these issues before we truly lose retail trust. Events like this erode confidence in the entire token economy.
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Any consensus the industry eventually reaches, regulators may build upon, add to, or formalize.
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Claims from projects saying “We didn’t know this is how it worked”—I find most of these claims unbelievable. In this case, they knew.
Movement Labs Scandal: Inside the Chaos of Market Making
Haseeb:
There’s been a lot of interesting news lately, including a CoinDesk report about Movement. A company tied to Movement Labs signed an agreement with a team called Web3 Port. The deal stated that if Movement’s fully diluted valuation exceeded $5 billion, Web3 Port could liquidate their tokens and split all proceeds from the sale with the foundation.
So the market maker acted as an "agent" in the token dump, incentivized to pump the token price. This benefited both the market maker and the Movement Foundation, raising serious concerns. They also received 5% of total supply—a massive amount relative to circulation, since less than 10% is currently circulating.
They dumped $38 million worth of MOVE tokens, leading Binance to ban the account. Initially, everyone involved denied it—until Coindex published the contract, resulting in Rushi, co-founder and CEO of Movement Labs, being fired. Now the situation seems to be settling. Movement is forming a new team and establishing a new entity called Movement Industries. Everything is chaotic, but Movement keeps falling.
The industry is now reflecting on why this happened, especially given strong backing from major VCs and successful marketing.
Evgeny, I don’t know if you were directly involved with Movement—can you help explain what happened? How common is this kind of arrangement in market-making agreements? What makes this different from normal ones? Help us understand.
Robert:
Before that, I should disclose that Robot Ventures is a very small investor in Movement, and we had no knowledge of any contracts or market-making arrangements and weren’t involved.
Evgeny:
This agreement was highly non-standard.
Typically, standard market-making agreements include key performance indicators (KPIs), such as uptime requirements and capital commitments—responsibilities of liquidity providers and market makers. In return, they receive incentives. Usually, market makers gain some benefit and, at the end of the contract, repay the token loan in stablecoins or USD at a predetermined exercise price—often 25%, 50%, or higher than the current price. That’s the typical setup.
This contract was highly non-standard because it lacked options or similar mechanisms. Instead, it featured a strange incentive to pump the token price—once the $5B threshold was hit, both the protocol and the market maker split the profits.
How Crypto Market Making Actually Works
Haseeb:
What role do market makers play, and how do they get involved in token listings?
Haseeb:
Usually, if you have a token, you can list it on a decentralized exchange (DEX) or similar platform, effectively providing liquidity yourself. But when you want to list on an exchange like Coinbase or Binance, you can't just launch and expect trading to happen.
These exchanges require sufficient liquidity—someone always ready to buy and sell. Typically, this role falls to market makers. So token issuers often sign agreements with market makers like Wintermute, specifying obligations such as maintaining bid-ask spreads.
In exchange, market makers are compensated because they take on risk and deploy capital. Often, projects lend tokens to market makers so they can operate, and sometimes compensation includes cash or option structures—allowing market makers to retain some tokens at a preset price, usually above the initial listing price—if the token performs well.
Why aren’t all market makers incentivized to pump token prices? You have option structures and exercise prices. Why wouldn’t your incentive be to pump every price?
Evgeny:
In theory, anyone could have that incentive. I understand why people think market makers want to pump token prices—the key is the scale of the incentive. In our case, we might get around 0.5% of token supply, often less. Now it's significantly lower, depending on the protocol’s market cap.
But even with an option structure, you must maintain high prices until contract expiry—because in these agreements, at least in ours, if the market maker fails to show proper bids/offers, the issuer can cancel the contract, voiding the options. Then you’d have to sell your tokens, potentially crashing the price. So the incentive must be strong enough to push the price up and still allow cash-out later.
In the Web3 Port case, there was a clear incentive to sell once the $5B valuation was reached. But there was another signal giving the market maker huge motivation—like $60 million or $100 million. That would never happen in our case because it’s too large. Even if a protocol gives 5% of supply to a market maker as profit, deploying $60 million into perpetual or market-making strategies incurs real costs. If you’re paid in protocol tokens and post $60 million as collateral, you have extra incentive to pump and dump MOVE tokens to recover those dollars. Otherwise, you lose daily due to funding costs.
Was It Rigged From the Start?
Haseeb:
We’re discussing a highly suspicious market-making agreement—this isn’t standard structure. How common is this? How many market makers operate this way? How many projects use such agreements?
Robert:
For example, a completely unknown market maker suddenly appears? Is it easy to create, shut down, and rebrand a market maker? What’s the story here?
Evgeny:
It’s possible. There are many market makers operating in Asia who don’t publicly promote themselves, so we rarely notice them. I know Kelsey Ventures, but before this scandal, almost no one knew they existed. It surprises me—I thought I knew all major players, yet new names keep emerging and getting involved in such operations.
I think such agreements are very rare among legitimate projects. But if we look at tokens listed only on tier-two or tier-three exchanges, never reaching mainstream platforms like Binance or Coinbase, I believe similar things likely happen frequently there.
Haseeb:
Robert, what was your first reaction when this broke?
Robert:
My first thought was: this happens all the time—we just don’t always see what goes on behind the scenes. More dramatic events probably happen daily but don’t reach outlets like CoinDesk. When I read it, I thought it was absurd. I wonder how many such farces are happening quietly in today’s market. Maybe some market makers are doing wild things while project teams lack negotiation experience, leading to unreasonable terms and incentives. It’s a disaster. But I’m glad the public now better understands how market makers operate—hopefully we’ll see more transparency going forward, since current levels are extremely low.
Evgeny:
But let me add: it’s hard for market makers to do this without an agreement. So claims from protocols saying “We didn’t know this is how it worked”—I find most of these claims unbelievable. In this case, they knew.
Tom:
The Movement case is odd—it wasn’t a top-tier project, nor a complete nobody. The project had some visibility, so someone should’ve flagged: “This isn’t right, it’s not standard.” But perhaps the team lacked experience, leading to these issues.
It reminds me of the pre-YC SAFE era in venture capital. Back then, each VC had custom convertible terms with harsh clauses—extreme liquidation preferences. YC SAFE brought transparency and standardization. Now everyone can pick a public standard contract. Market making today feels like the pre-FAST era. If you understand the rules, you might negotiate a decent deal, but there’s no industry standard.
Haseeb:
Exactly. While services like Coinwatch exist to help projects navigate market-making negotiations—since market makers are repeat players while project teams usually go through token issuance once—your first collaboration with a market maker and listing on a major exchange is one of the most critical liquidity decisions. So there are good and bad market makers.
Sometimes, if you're not deep in the crypto circle or lack referrals, it's hard to tell who has good reputation and who doesn’t.
Evgeny:
We have competitors across DeFi, centralized exchanges, venture capital, and decentralized market making—but only a few market makers can cover all these areas.
Movement Labs and Its Industry Impact
Haseeb:
Beyond how market-making mechanics work, what stands out is the focus on the team—what drove the founders to make these choices? The Movement team was praised for being young, energetic, and ambitious. Why did they choose this path? What made founders opt out of fair competition, choosing instead to dump tokens and cash out early rather than deliver a real product?
They faced heavy criticism for launching a token without a real product. Rumors swirled—relying on contractors, weak tech team, prioritizing marketing over substance. Most were rumors, with no solid evidence. But people said they manipulated traffic, skipped airdrops, launched tokens without real products—all pointing to potential misconduct.
After discussing post-mortems with several insiders, I have questions. First, has this changed your view of startups or founders? What are founder incentives in the industry? Are there really countless Rushi-like founders? People talk about this, but there’s no proof. I haven’t seen many other projects like Movement. What are your thoughts?
Tom:
I think this is indeed rare—that’s why it got so much attention. But recently I read a Coin Telegraph article mentioning market-making agreements—I think people underestimate the number of obscure, low-quality projects in the long tail. As you said, they target tier-two, tier-three exchanges and market makers. But for a high-profile project to launch at a $30–40 billion valuation and face this? That’s insane.
Haseeb:
Evgeny, what’s your take? When the next token approaches you, what will you watch for? What should we look for?
Evgeny:
For me, I’m highly sensitive to founders who are overly flashy and marketing-focused. But I know in Silicon Valley, traditional VCs often like such founders—they bring energy—and I know aggressive types often correlate with fraud. After this, I’ll be more selective and cautious.
Haseeb:
I’d like Robert’s view, but we didn’t invest—not because we thought they’d dump tokens or break lockups. I don’t think any founder was seen as someone who’d break locks and dump.
We didn’t invest because we didn’t find their tech interesting. We saw it as just a derivative project. When I first met Rushi—only once or twice—I found him energetic, charismatic, ambitious. Now it’s become a meme—Blockworks once ran a promotional piece on Movement, repeating how young they were and how much money they raised. People seem to think being young and well-funded automatically makes you a great founder.
Haseeb:
What’s your take on investing in Rushi?
Robert:
In Series A, investment relies less on founders, but in early stages like seed rounds, it’s entirely founder-dependent. We don’t focus much on technical scalability—we look at the founder’s eyes, ambition, and motivations. Do I believe they can succeed?
As rounds progress, reliance shifts toward actual progress—technical milestones, fundraising results. By Series C or D, the founder matters less—they’ve proven themselves—focus is on performance. It’s a progression, and our investment fell within this transitional phase.
Why Crypto Needs Market Maker Disclosure
Haseeb:
In traditional markets, you must disclose your market maker. In crypto, exchanges know who your market maker is—Binance and Coinbase know. You must provide this info before listing. But retail investors and the public don’t know. In my ideal world, the information gap between exchanges and retail investors should be nearly zero. When you apply for listing, public knowledge should match what the exchange knows. I think we should move in this direction, but we’re far from it. I even believe terms of market-making agreements should be disclosed. Hester Pierce mentioned this in her speech—she detailed crypto disclosure frameworks and recommended public disclosure of market-making terms.
What do you think? Would you strongly oppose this as impossible, or see it as beneficial? How do you view this?
Evgeny:
I strongly support this idea because we must admit that although we pretend tokens aren’t stocks, they behave very similarly to stocks. For IPOs, stocks require extensive disclosures about market makers, investors, and risks. Hester’s speech was exactly about this. But we’re not just talking about parity between exchanges and retail—we’re talking about platform investors having as much information as possible to make informed buying decisions. And we’re failing at that.
I believe core elements of market-making agreements—loan size, exercise price—are crucial. As a retail investor, you need to know a market maker’s incentives—e.g., they’re incentivized to sell above a certain price. Once price exceeds that level, more selling pressure may emerge, or they may hold—but at least you’re informed.
We actually had a disclosure initiative—World Coin, about six months ago. I remember World Coin disclosed loans, market makers, and exercise prices, but faced heavy backlash. People questioned why such structures existed—as if no other token had similar setups. They got heavily criticized, and I don’t think they enjoyed it. More importantly, every founder since then became more cautious.
We can choose to disclose and be accountable to investors, or stay silent to avoid criticism. That’s where our industry stands today: no disclosure, but if you disclose, you get attacked.
Robert:
So if disclosure is voluntary, it creates an equilibrium where no one discloses. Under mandatory disclosure, everyone must disclose—just like registered securities operate.
Do you think we need such a requirement to drive change, or can self-regulatory steps encourage issuers to disclose market-maker info?
Evgeny:
I’ve thought about this—usually we can organize a summit, reach consensus, and agree to disclose. I believe disclosure is ultimately very beneficial for market makers. It helps normalize markets by creating standards. Once standards exist, others are forced to follow—or opt out. Without SEC mandates, this is genuinely difficult.
Haseeb:
I think there are three effective channels for standardization. First, through exchanges. Simplest—if Coinbase or Binance decide you must disclose to list, everyone will comply because they want access to those platforms. Disclosure becomes mandatory before listing applications.
Second, through venture capital firms. A small number of high-reputation VCs could agree on a standard disclosure policy, requiring portfolio companies to comply. Like an附加 clause.
Third, through market makers themselves. High-reputation market makers unafraid to disclose their agreements could collectively agree: if you work with a non-disclosing market maker, that’s suspicious.
The issue with market makers agreeing is: without mandatory full disclosure, you might have one or two clean actors alongside bad actors like Web3 Port. Rushi might’ve had multiple market makers—one of whom dumped.
I think we need uniformity—ensuring all market makers are disclosed and known to exchanges. Exchanges see who trades assets, who provides liquidity. You can’t operate on an exchange without them knowing. So if you’re a primary liquidity provider on Binance or Coinbase, you’re also the main executor.
The last option is waiting for the SEC. But I think the SEC will take too long, and the final disclosure regime won’t be what we want. If we proactively create a disclosure system that fits us, it benefits the industry more. Aligning with traditional securities brings two problems: you get useless, purely formal disclosures no one cares about, and poor balance between disclosure cost and value.
Finally, some argue disclosure implies tokens are securities. I think it’s worth discussing upfront: disclosure benefits everything. Disclosing is good regardless of security status. Many non-securities disclose information.
Ultimately, more disclosure is good. We can say it’s unrelated to securities—this is just how you list on exchanges. If you want listing, you must disclose. It’s not about securities law, nor does it mean the asset is an unregistered security.
When a token prepares for listing, there’s always a main counterparty negotiating—possibly a foundation or someone holding large supply. Even without direct ties, someone usually acts as a “representative” on the exchange’s other side. Even if the protocol is fully decentralized, someone likely drives the listing. Regardless of whether they’re the “issuer,” they should bear responsibility for necessary disclosures to enable listing and liquidity.
I believe, as an industry, we need to mature and solve these issues before we truly lose retail trust. Events like this erode confidence in the entire token economy.
Evgeny:
It’s not just market-making agreements—many other things need disclosure, like major transactions. Any material deal should be disclosed.
Robert:
It affects whether people are willing to buy or sell an asset. We’re finally at a point where certain information starts being shared with everyone—like token unlock schedules, which didn’t exist years ago. Everyone discusses schedules, but also investor cost basis—where their capital came from.
Haseeb:
But much work remains to build proper disclosure frameworks. I think overall market trust, especially in tokens, could gradually deteriorate. So I strongly urge anyone seriously considering this to act quickly—even if imperfectly.
You can always improve and refine later. And any consensus the industry eventually reaches, regulators may build upon, add to, or formalize. Best for the industry to lead—show good faith not just to regulators, but to ourselves, boosting investor confidence.
Do Market Makers Control Token Prices?
Haseeb:
There’s been a lot of discussion about market makers lately, especially after the Movement Labs incident. As a venture investor, I feel relieved—previously, VCs were seen as the “bad guys,” now people increasingly see market makers as the “bad guys.”
Can market makers really control token prices? How can we trust you’re not manipulating prices? How much influence do market makers really have? What’s your response to people saying “Once Wintermute joins market making, the token price drops”?
Evgeny:
Now market makers are the new “bad guys.” It’s cyclical. In bull markets, people say market makers pump prices; in bear markets, they say market makers dump prices. Two months ago we were seen as “bad guys,” but now it’s shifting. I think people always seek someone to blame.
Haseeb:
Market makers play very different roles across market cycles.
Evgeny:
Often people just want someone to blame instead of understanding market structure and liquidity mechanics. Much discussion about market makers stems from misunderstanding. For example, some think we take tokens from Binance, dump them to crash prices, and let Binance profit from liquidations. That logic is flawed—both we and Binance profit from retail traders.
Haseeb:
So you don’t want retail investors to lose?
Evgeny:
Of course, we want retail investors to lose as little as possible. Over the past few months, retail liquidations have been severe, driving many out of the market. January was good for us, but February, March, and April were not.
Haseeb:
When retail activity declines, market making becomes less attractive. How’s your liquidity now?
Evgeny:
It’s not linear. If volume drops 50%, our revenue doesn’t drop 50%—it drops more.
Haseeb:
Related to crypto volatility. Do you think crypto’s price volatility and momentum effects make market making more complex?
Evgeny:
Actually, no. Our models operate across multiple platforms, buying and selling between them. The problem arises when large liquidity funds suddenly enter and start buying a token—price spikes fast, hard for us to respond.
Haseeb:
How badly do you lose in such cases?
Evgeny:
About 50% of our contracts lose money.
Robert:
But do your winning contracts offset the losing ones?
Evgeny:
Yes, our business is diversified—we also do OTC trading, which helps boost returns in liquidity provision.
Haseeb:
What about option structures—do they exist in traditional finance, or are they unique to crypto?
Evgeny:
Similar structures exist in traditional finance, but not identical. In crypto, market makers often play investment banking roles too.
Haseeb:
Why did crypto evolve this way? Do you think it’s related to token cash flows and volatility?
Evgeny:
Possibly. Market evolution may stem from extreme token volatility, pushing market makers toward option-based profits. As markets mature, token pricing becomes more efficient, volatility decreases, and market making may resemble traditional finance more.
Haseeb:
If market structure changes, how will market makers adapt?
Evgeny:
If new models emerge—say Binance introduces a new mechanism—market makers may provide liquidity differently. Ultimately, changes in market structure affect how market makers operate.
Crypto Market Structure Act: What’s at Stake?
Haseeb:
A new market infrastructure bill recently emerged—an extensive rewrite of the previous FIT21 bill. While spiritually similar, it has notable differences.
The bill clearly defines digital assets and tokens, specifying when tokens are securities versus non-securities. The CFTC will oversee spot markets for non-security crypto tokens, while the SEC retains authority over fundraising and fraud enforcement. Projects can raise up to $150 million annually in tokens if they plan to decentralize. Unlike the prior “code decentralization test,” a new “maturity test” is introduced—mature blockchain protocols must be decentralized and/or autonomous, with no single party controlling over 20% of voting power, and value primarily derived from the blockchain’s procedural functions. The definition is vague—I don’t fully grasp its boundaries, possibly intentionally so. It’s unclear how teams or groups controlling systems fit in. Many issues in crypto—multisig, security councils, upgradability—remain unclear under immature blockchain definitions. The bill delays DeFi regulation, with a relatively narrow current definition.
I’d like to hear your general thoughts on this bill.
Robert:
I haven’t spent much time on it because all bills evolve—initial drafts are never final. Look at stablecoin legislation—it’s clearly evolving. I expect this bill to change significantly—definitions, core structures. We’re far from signing. If passed as-is, I think it’s a big upgrade for everyone—founders, VCs, market makers, retail investors. It improves the pre-legislation market structure.
As an outsider, I estimate a 40–50% chance it passes. It’s a cycle-based estimate—we have about 18 months until the next election, which resets the game. So if it passes, it’ll likely happen soon.
Stablecoin legislation progress will signal the likelihood of market structure passage. If stablecoin bills reach conclusion, and the Senate finds a version it likes, accepted broadly by the House, that bodes well for market structure. If the House rejects the Senate version and demands revisions, that’s bad for all crypto legislation. So if you want to predict market structure outcomes, watch stablecoin bills.
Haseeb:
We’ve seen significant Democratic opposition to this bill, mainly due to Trump family trades. This suggests meaningful legislative compromise is hard. Evgeny, how much time have you spent on this? What impact do you think it has on your industry?
Evgeny:
I haven’t read the bill in detail, but we’ll definitely provide feedback. We’re deeply connected in crypto. I noticed CFTC seems granted more power than SEC—I’m still thinking if that’s appropriate. Personally, I prefer the existing SEC structure—my instinct is that if more power is given, it should go to SEC.
Depends on legal specifics. If the law merely outlines rules and enforcement responsibilities, it matters less.
Haseeb:
I think it matters a lot. One thing we learned over the past four years is that you can do many things within legal boundaries that aren’t always clear. We’re facing that now.
Evgeny:
I think a clearer legal framework would be better.
Haseeb:
Yes, it might reduce some risks, but reality is—crypto is complex and messy. Most activities don’t cleanly fit any legal framework.
Tom, what’s your take on the market infrastructure bill?
Tom:
It’s still early—I haven’t spent much time, but it shows how hard writing good crypto legislation is. It’s either too specific or not specific enough, leading to suboptimal outcomes. This applies beyond crypto, but crypto’s pace and ambiguity amplify it.
Can We Fix Problems Before Crypto Collapses?
Haseeb:
This means, if only stablecoin bills pass and not market structure bills, the industry must self-regulate and establish norms. So future governments or rulemakers can see the industry’s state,
Robert:
That has merit, but isn’t fully accurate. Forty years ago, the SEC under Gensler could’ve created rules via exemptions, frameworks, interpretations—but didn’t. Future SEC or CFTC can do the same. They don’t need legislation to create trading frameworks for different securities or assets—they already have authority. It doesn’t have to come from Congress. So even without congressional action, it doesn’t all fall on us.
Haseeb:
I think that’s not quite right. The SEC explicitly says they lack congressional mandate. That’s what Gensler originally said, and what the new SEC says—Congress must act to provide clarity, otherwise who regulates? Both SEC and CFTC say Congress’s stance is clear. Debate over bills means no one has clear authority. Without it, SEC says: “We shouldn’t make rules.” That creates a regulatory void.
Robert:
But they can regulate via formal and informal rulemaking. They’ve issued many interpretive statements on various projects. Not ideal, but they are doing something.
Haseeb:
But mostly, these are retractions of prior statements. Much of what we see are speeches, not rulemaking. So far, SEC hasn’t issued any formal rules.
Evgeny:
Our basic understanding—like Bitcoin not being a security—isn’t legally confirmed by Congress, but decided by SEC.
Haseeb:
So you could say: “I don’t think this is within my jurisdiction.” But I don’t think SEC will say: “These aren’t securities, here’s how they should operate.” You can’t do both. If they’re not securities, they’re outside SEC jurisdiction. If you classify certain tokens as securities, that’s it—SEC no longer regulates non-securities.
Will CFTC step in? Will they say: “Okay, we’ll make rules requiring disclosure of X and Y”? I haven’t seen CFTC act here. Maybe they will, but currently both agencies say they’re waiting for Congress, and the jurisdictional gap keeps shifting. If Congress doesn’t act, it means they deliberately chose not to legislate. That leaves crypto in an unregulated state.
Will CFTC step in? Will they say: “Okay, we’ll make rules requiring disclosure of X and Y”? I haven’t seen CFTC act here. Maybe they will, but currently both agencies say they’re waiting for Congress, and the jurisdictional gap keeps shifting. If Congress doesn’t act, it means they deliberately chose not to legislate. That leaves crypto in an unregulated state.
So I truly believe, as an industry, we have a responsibility to fix this—not just for potential future regulations, but for our own sake. We need to reduce market volatility and boost consumer confidence in token listings. People need to know whether a listed token is trustworthy, not vulnerable to dumping by shady market makers.
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