The Quantum Computing Threat to Bitcoin
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The Quantum Computing Threat to Bitcoin
The real test is not whether the threat exists, but whether networks can coordinate and transition methodically to quantum-resistant signature algorithms before sufficiently powerful quantum computers emerge.
Navigating Web3 tides with focused insightsBy: Bitcoin Magazine Pro
Translated by: Baihua Blockchain
Bitcoin is facing its first true existential threat—not from government bans or market crashes, but from quantum computing. The 1.1 million BTC (worth roughly $100 billion) held in Satoshi Nakamoto’s wallet—and approximately 25% of all circulating BTC—are currently exposed to outdated cryptographic keys highly vulnerable to quantum attacks. When quantum computers mature—whether in 5 or 25 years—these bitcoins will be compromised.
Where the Threat Lies
Bitcoin’s security relies on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). These algorithms make it mathematically infeasible to forge Bitcoin signatures without knowledge of the private key. For classical computers, breaking such signatures would take millions of years. Quantum computers, however, operate fundamentally differently and could solve the discrete logarithm problem underlying ECDSA in minutes—or hours.
Figure 1: Satoshi Nakamoto’s wallet holds nearly 1.1 million BTC.
Not all bitcoins face equal risk. Early Pay-to-PubKey (P2PK) addresses—including Satoshi’s—expose their public keys directly on the ledger. For these coins, quantum computers act like a “master key” granting direct access to the wallet. In contrast, later address types (e.g., Pay-to-PubKey-Hash, P2PKH) conceal the public key behind a cryptographic hash, revealing it only upon initiating a transaction. This creates a narrow vulnerability window: between the moment a user reveals their public key to send funds and the time the transaction is confirmed by miners, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could theoretically intercept and steal the funds.
Uncertainty in the Timeline
The timeline for quantum computing remains highly uncertain—it could arrive within a year, or never at all. Yet uncertainty itself is the enemy, because Bitcoin requires proactive migration, not passive adaptation. If quantum computers emerge before Bitcoin migrates to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), Bitcoin will collapse. Thousands of billions of dollars’ worth of public keys will be exposed, enabling attackers to begin stealing bitcoins and dumping them onto the market—triggering a catastrophic price crash.
Figure 2: Comparison of long-term exposure vulnerabilities across different Bitcoin address types.
Even under ideal conditions, finalizing PQC code and achieving consensus would take 6–12 months; the migration process itself—depending on signature optimization—could require an additional 6 months to 2 years.
Coin Burning
The question arises: should a hard deadline be set to “burn” bitcoins that have not migrated to quantum-resistant addresses by that date? If roughly 20–30% of the supply were simultaneously unlocked (i.e., compromised), Bitcoin would face a massive crisis of confidence, shattering its “hard money” thesis. A supply shock of this magnitude would create bear-market conditions and potentially jeopardize Bitcoin’s entire philosophical foundation.
Figure 3: Bitcoin’s circulating supply.
However, coin burning faces profound philosophical hurdles. It effectively means Bitcoin can become confiscable property. If the network decides it may redeem itself by burning coins, what prevents governments—or other controllers—from deciding which addresses (e.g., those belonging to terrorists or dissidents) may be burned and censored? Such a precedent would destroy sovereign individual ownership of assets.
The Primary Target
Bitcoin is the world’s largest “honey pot.” It is the only financial network where you can directly steal value and immediately liquidate it with 24/7 liquidity. The U.S. dollar cannot do this—large-scale theft triggers frozen transfers, and even if hacked, institutions typically reimburse customers. Bitcoin affords no such luxury; it rests entirely on trust in code.
Figure 4: A significant number of addresses hold balances exceeding 10,000 BTC.
If someone achieves quantum-computing capability capable of breaking Bitcoin’s cryptography, Bitcoin wallets will become the top target—because they’re easier to monetize and offer first-mover advantage. If the money is already taken by the first attacker, the second gains nothing.
Conclusion
Although this existential vulnerability has long been acknowledged in cryptographic literature, the window for preventive action is narrowing—demanding immediate strategic attention from miners, exchanges, wallet providers, and individual stakeholders. The real test is not whether the threat exists, but whether the network can coordinate and execute an orderly migration to quantum-resistant signature algorithms before sufficiently powerful quantum computers emerge.
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