科普：Why the Fed Can't Control All Dollars
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科普：Why the Fed Can't Control All Dollars
A 70-year-old blockchain system of the dollar.
Navigating Web3 tides with focused insightsAuthor: Joy Liu
This article is the text version of the YouTube video titled "Why the Fed Cannot Control All Dollars — A 70-Year-Old Dollar Blockchain System," discussing the role of the U.S. dollar in the global economy and presenting a counterintuitive perspective:
The Federal Reserve cannot fully control the global influence of the dollar.
We all know that the U.S. dollar is the world's most important fiat currency, and its movements trigger fluctuations across the global economy. But have you ever considered this from another angle? There’s actually a contradiction between this idea and our daily reality. Outside the United States, people use their own national currencies for commercial transactions. In these places, since we don’t directly see dollars circulating, how exactly does the dollar still exert control over global markets?
Outside the U.S., how much influence does the Federal Reserve really have over the dollar?
And what efforts have other major economies—like China—made to secure space for their own currencies within a dollar-dominated system?
How do dollar-denominated assets and U.S. government debt affect other countries—and how do those countries, in turn, leverage the dollar and U.S. debt?
In this episode, we’ll analyze all these questions. And once again, I’ve brought in a guest to help.
Yes, today’s guest is Jeff Snider. His primary research focus is Eurodollars, and if you follow English-language financial content, you’re likely already familiar with him. He’s often jokingly referred to as the “Jesus of Eurodollars.”
Then why isn't it called "offshore dollar" instead?
Jeff:
For many people, that would actually be a better term. The term "Eurodollar" is confusing—when people hear “Euro,” they immediately think of the euro, which is the only widely known term associated with Europe. But in fact, “Eurodollar” originally referred to U.S. dollars held primarily in Europe but outside the United States, because it originated in Europe.
The City of London acquired the name “Eurodollar” at some point in the 1950s. No one knows exactly when the term first appeared, because everything was happening underground. Banks were trading U.S. dollars for various reasons back then. Eurodollar is an offshore U.S. dollar system that began taking on the role of a reserve currency because it proved useful in many different places—especially in postwar Europe.
As more and more dollars were created, it gradually became the de facto reserve currency. By the 1960s, it had effectively replaced the Bretton Woods system as the global reserve currency mechanism. Although it’s called the dollar, we need to remember: there are no actual physical U.S. dollars involved—no paper bills printed by the U.S. government, no Federal Reserve notes, and not even much in bank reserves. It’s a virtual, unbacked, ledger-based monetary system that has filled the role of a reserve currency. So it’s centered around banks and balance sheets, and the real participants are global banks. These are dollars circulating globally because it functions as a reserve currency.
Hardly any corner of the world remains untouched by the Eurodollar. The reason we experienced such massive global prosperity in the second half of the 20th century is that the Eurodollar system enabled widespread adoption and funding of innovation and technology around the world. So when the Eurodollar worked well, the world benefited immensely.
But since August 2007, things have changed. The world has been moving in the opposite direction—globalization has faced resistance, economic growth has slowed. Yet for all practical purposes, you must treat the Eurodollar as the true reserve currency system.
Does the dollar enslave the world—or does the world enslave the dollar?
During the decades when the dollar has been widely used globally, our general perception of its influence has been:
Joy: Does the dollar essentially hold the global economy hostage? Because it’s the reserve currency, and only the United States can control it?
Jeff:
This is also a misconception. Although it’s called the dollar, the U.S. government doesn’t have direct control over it. The only way the U.S. government can influence global economic and monetary conditions is through sanctions. When they tried to cut Russia off from the SWIFT system, they had to ask banks not to let Russians transact via SWIFT.
SWIFT is merely a messaging system owned by a consortium of global banks. Again, this reflects a huge misunderstanding—that the dollar is controlled by the U.S. government or the Federal Reserve. The U.S. government wants you to believe they possess this power and authority, but the Eurodollar system was never designed that way.
One of the original reasons dates back to the Soviet Union, which didn’t want to keep its dollar deposits in American banks because they feared the Eisenhower administration—and later Kennedy and Johnson—might seize them. So they deposited those dollars in banks in Montreal, Zurich, and London. This was a major development.
This allowed them to conduct transactions in dollar terms, but outside U.S. jurisdiction and beyond the reach of the U.S. government. Because this arrangement persisted for so long, few truly understood what was happening, leading to the misconception that the dollar is a national currency operated by the U.S. government, with the Federal Reserve as its central authority. But that’s not the case.
So when we ask whether the dollar dominates the world, we must also consider *how* the dollar transmits its influence—through channels like SWIFT. I discussed SWIFT in detail in my previous video about the RMB, including its mechanics and data on usage shares across currencies. Feel free to revisit that episode.
A Dollar Blockchain Brewing Since the 1950s
Jeff:
You can now see why I use the term “Eurodollar”—because it makes a distinction. What we’re really talking about is a bank-centered monetary system denominated in dollars.
It’s priced in dollars, but there are no physical dollars involved. So it’s essentially bank money. Therefore, it’s not the U.S. government controlling the Eurodollar system, nor did America impose dollar dominance globally by force. The truth is, the Eurodollar system became dominant because it was the most useful and widely available monetary system. Because it was useful and accessible, that’s why it’s still in use today.
It wasn’t made useful by the U.S. government—it was inherently useful. It did what it needed to do, at least at the minimal capacity required of a reserve currency system. So the U.S. government wants you to believe it controls the dollar. But the Russian example shows they face serious limitations, because the Eurodollar exists outside their control—and it’s the Eurodollar that matters, not what the U.S. government says.
Following Jeff’s explanation, the interconnected accounting systems among global banks are what enable this network of dollar transactions. As dollars flow between banks and get recorded, unless the U.S. government uses hard political measures to block certain regions from using dollars, it’s extremely difficult to exert comprehensive control over the Eurodollar system.
Now, doesn’t this sound familiar? If we treat each bank’s ledger as a node, and banks constantly record dollar transactions with each other, this system starts to look suspiciously like blockchain. That’s just a personal analogy—I’m not saying blockchain is the focus here.
A System ≠ A Unified Consciousness
I recently opened up a limited number of one-on-one video appointment slots with viewers, and one viewer shared a perspective I strongly agree with—and I’d like to share it with you. We often oversimplify institutions or systems into monolithic entities with unified intentions. But in reality, every system contains internal conflicts and competing interests, especially large ones. This means the evolution of any system over decades involves a great deal of contingency and randomness.
I support this view because it’s frequently obscured—intentionally or unintentionally—by media outlets. Everyone wants big headlines. Simplifying a complex system into a single actor makes enemies (or allies) feel vivid and tangible, easily triggering emotional responses from the public. But conversely, it also becomes a catalyst pushing public opinion toward extremism.
Therefore, when consuming information, we should consciously remind ourselves: any system is complex and diverse, lacking absolute unity of purpose. This helps us see things more objectively and avoid falling into conspiracy theories.
The full transcript of this episode is also available in the description. If you have questions about any concepts or terms, feel free to use my script as a learning resource. Joining my email list ensures you’ll be the first to hear about new ideas or channel updates. Given my long production cycle, email notifications are the fastest way to stay updated.
Back to the topic of the dollar.
What Is the Function and Significance of Reserves?
In my conversation with Jeff, he brought up an interesting point about reserve currencies. Everyone knows the dollar is the current reserve currency, but most people rarely stop to consider: Why do reserve currencies exist in the first place? What’s their deeper purpose?
Jeff:
I don’t think most people truly understand what a reserve currency is. You don’t think about it because it doesn’t seem to affect your daily life. Many assume being a reserve currency means you can price goods—like oil—in your own currency.
Actually, that’s just a byproduct. A reserve currency is a medium, an intermediary. How do you connect distant economies with their own independent monetary systems and arrangements? How do you enable seamless, efficient trade? How do investment flows move from one part of the world to another?
The Eurodollar plays this role as an intermediary currency—sometimes called a “vehicle currency.” Take, for example, a Swiss franc deposit held by a wealthy client at a Swiss bank. They want to invest in a growing Asian economy like Thailand.
Without a common intermediary currency, this would be very difficult. You’d offer Thai baht Swiss francs, but Thailand has no use for francs. The only solution is a bridge currency—one that’s usable both at the origin and destination.
If the Swiss bank converts francs into dollars, and then uses those dollars to invest in Thailand, it works—because dollars are available in Switzerland and accepted in Thailand. Thus, capital can flow globally through the dollar as an intermediary. Suddenly, someone holding cash in Switzerland can invest in Thailand without barriers.
The sole prerequisite for this to work is that the dollar must be widely available and useful in many parts of the world—as it is in the form of Eurodollars. Because it became useful and accessible globally, it has endured. It’s not due to politics, but because it solved a massive problem: we have a globalized economy, but no true international currency.
The Eurodollar effectively became that international currency, allowing disparate systems to integrate seamlessly—or nearly so. It’s not perfect; nothing is. And since 2007, it’s become increasingly fragile. But no other monetary system even comes close to enabling capital and credit flows from one end of the Earth to the other, connecting places previously thought impossible to link. That’s why the Eurodollar is useful.
In other words, we can understand reserve currencies through the lens of transaction media—a concept deeply tied to the evolution of human economic activity. Thousands of years ago, humans used seashells as exchange media. More recently, during Germany’s hyperinflation, people used cigarettes or even wallpapered windows with worthless banknotes.
Fed rate changes aren’t monetary policy
Now, regarding U.S. influence over the Eurodollar system, I suspect many viewers—including myself—would raise a question: Doesn’t the Fed’s interest rate hikes and cuts clearly impact dollar pricing and economic activity? If U.S. control over the Eurodollar system is so limited, how should we interpret the Fed’s rate changes and their spillover effects on overseas economies?
Jeff:
The Fed tries to project the image of a powerful technocratic institution. But nobody really thinks about what the Fed actually does. People just assume the Fed controls the dollar because it has the printing press. But the Eurodollar system doesn’t need physical U.S. dollars at all. Therefore, the Fed’s influence over Eurodollars is very limited.
Not zero—but far less than people imagine. In fact, it’s extremely limited. As the Eurodollar emerged in the 1950s and matured in the 1960s, the monetary system began changing. This meant many things: it was an unbacked system, largely controlled by interbank transactions. It became a blank canvas, allowing banks to innovate in unprecedented forms of money—like derivatives.
Most people don’t know what derivatives are or their function, but in many ways, they represent alternative forms of money. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Federal Reserve found itself unable to even define the money being used in the real economy in meaningful ways. So throughout the 1970s, the Fed struggled to understand what was happening in the monetary system.
And all of this happened offshore—the Eurodollar component, denominated in dollars but existing on commercial banks’ balance sheets worldwide, outside the U.S. The Fed essentially lost control of the monetary system. When Paul Volcker took office, he didn’t fight inflation by mastering the system—he admitted, “We don’t know how to monitor, let alone regulate, the dollars flowing through the global system.”
So instead, they tried to influence bank and economic agent behavior by raising or lowering a single interest rate. They eventually targeted the federal funds rate. Think about it: the idea that they could control the entire monetary system by adjusting the federal funds rate is absurd—especially since the federal funds rate itself isn’t even that significant.
When the federal funds rate changes year after year, how much does it really affect your decisions? Your inherent discount rate usually outweighs minor rate adjustments. So basically, this is what the Fed has been doing since the early 1980s.
Let me add: the Federal Funds Rate—the benchmark rate we commonly refer to—is actually a tool introduced in the 1970s, after the last major U.S. inflation crisis. Before that, the most important rate was the discount rate.
I’ve covered this history in previous videos.
Jeff:
Starting in the late 1970s, they realized they couldn’t control the monetary system. They didn’t even know how to define money, let alone regulate it. So, to at least pretend they had influence over the monetary system and the U.S. economy, they’ve spent decades targeting the federal funds rate and calling it “monetary policy”—but in reality, it’s just interest rate policy, not true monetary policy.
They hoped that by raising the federal funds rate, they could reduce credit and slow economic growth. But it doesn’t work that way. As long as people believe the Fed controls everything via the federal funds rate, no one asks what the Fed is actually doing.
Then, when the system collapsed in 2007 and 2008, the mere fact of that crisis should cast serious doubt on the Fed’s capabilities. If the Fed were truly powerful, how could there have been such a severe dollar shortage in 2007–2008?
Anyway, they responded to the 2008 crisis with quantitative easing (QE), which everyone called “money printing”—creating reserves out of thin air. It seemed like massive money creation. Each time the Fed launched QE, people said it would cause runaway inflation because “printing money causes inflation.”
Yet it never caused inflation. 2020 was different, but throughout the 2010s, people kept predicting each round of QE would unleash uncontrollable inflation—and it never happened. No one paused to ask: Why not? Why didn’t it happen? Because the Fed and its bank reserves aren’t money. The Fed doesn’t print money. Its influence over the actual monetary system is very limited.
Cognitive Bias / Confirmation Bias
By this point in the video, I suspect many viewers find these perspectives very different from mainstream media narratives. If you feel that way, then I’ve achieved my goal. Why? Because I want to share a mindset. All of us are highly susceptible to confirmation bias.
Confirmation bias—also known as confirmatory bias—means we tend to seek out or accept views we already believe to be true. Social media platforms exploit this cognitive trait—call it a flaw—and continuously feed us content we subconsciously agree with. The result? We reinforce our existing beliefs, grow hostile toward opposing views, and perceive even sincere discussions as threats.
Once we realize this mental loop isn’t productive, we should actively allow our own views to be questioned and challenged. By examining issues from multiple angles and constantly refining our understanding, we build a more robust mental framework and avoid knee-jerk opposition to differing opinions.
Otherwise, we risk becoming biased and extreme. That’s why you’ll see me reply to comments—even critical ones. Only through dialogue can intellectual interaction occur. Even viewers who watch regularly but never comment may gain broader perspectives by reading these exchanges.
That way, both I and my audience as a whole can keep improving. I hope viewers can apply this multi-angle thinking to real-life challenges—whether in careers, personal decisions, or investments. As the creator, I can’t force anyone to share my values, but I strive to practice what I believe is right.
Isn’t the repo agreement a way for the U.S. to control the dollar?
In my previous episode with Joseph, we discussed the Fed’s overnight repurchase agreements—the area he worked on while at the Fed. The Fed uses repos and reverse repos to help foreign central banks or financial institutions address liquidity issues. So—
Joy: The Fed has done a lot, establishing many swap lines. In a way, this helps other countries solve liquidity shortages. Doesn’t this provide extra supply to the rest of the world when needed?
Jeff:
That was their intention. But I’d argue the actual execution of these swap programs was worse. Look, they opened dollar swaps in December 2007. So they started providing offshore dollar liquidity to major central banks from 2007 onward. Yet we still experienced a global dollar crisis. How effective could these swaps have been?
They made the swaps virtually unlimited in summer 2008, right during the worst phase of the crisis. From September to November 2008, there were massive withdrawals from these offshore dollar facilities. Yet we still had a crisis. We saw the worst six months of global economic performance since the Great Depression—mainly due to extreme dollar scarcity and unavailability.
This triggered liquidity problems across global markets. So again, how effective were these dollar swaps from the start? This is one of those things you’re supposed to accept at face value without digging deeper—because it supports the myth of the Fed as the world’s central bank.
The Fed is portrayed as the main provider of dollars to the rest of the world, using sophisticated and highly effective tools. But that’s simply not true. For example, in 2018 or 2019, central banks around the world complained about dollar shortages in their regions.
U.R. Patel, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, wrote in the Financial Times in June 2018 that there was a global dollar shortage. The idea that the Fed’s dollar swaps provided meaningful liquidity support—let alone minimal support—to the rest of the world contradicts what we observe across the system.
This brings us back to the broader issue: the Eurodollar system is malfunctioning. The Fed doesn’t know how to fix it—and may not even want to.
Possibility of Regional Reserve Currencies
Jeff:
There’s a possibility that certain national currencies could become regional reserve currencies. Historically, monetary systems were often regional rather than fully global. So it’s possible that various blocs might primarily use one national currency or another for trade. But I don’t think that’s sufficient. We’ve entered a globalized system.
We genuinely need a global monetary system, and no national currency comes close to fulfilling that role. Most people immediately think of China’s RMB, but even the Chinese themselves don’t want the yuan to be internationalized. About a decade ago, they made a half-hearted attempt to create offshore markets—or at least begin developing offshore RMB.
But they never let it flourish as it potentially could. I’m skeptical, but at least they started the experiment—then sort of abandoned it. They pulled the plug, saying, “We’re not comfortable with this.” That’s why Chinese authorities themselves have long advocated for the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as an international alternative to the Eurodollar.
But that’s even more impractical than any other framework, because the SDR is just another bureaucratic construct.
SDR stands for Special Drawing Rights—an international currency created by the IMF. Its value is currently determined by a weighted basket of five major currencies: the U.S. dollar, euro, yen, pound sterling, and renminbi—with the dollar having the largest weight and the yen the smallest. The SDR’s value is updated every business day as exchange rates fluctuate.
However, the composition weights are only revised every five years. I explained the details in my video about the RMB—you can review that episode.
Japan’s awkward position in the Eurodollar system
If we zoom in slightly and examine Japan’s role in the Eurodollar system, we see—
Jeff:
If you’re a Japanese bank and you’re short on dollars—by the way, Japanese banks are short trillions of dollars daily—and if the market refuses to roll over your funding, what do you do? You have almost no options, except possibly turning to the Bank of Japan, which might lend you some of its backup dollar reserves. The BOJ and Japanese government have been hoarding dollar-denominated reserve assets for years—a red flag in itself.
Since the Asian financial crisis, the Japanese government has accumulated dollar-denominated assets as reserves—another crisis rooted in dollar scarcity. So the Japanese government might lend you some dollars. They sell some U.S. Treasuries, generate liquid dollar assets, and lend them to you to replace the funding the market failed to renew, as conditions worsen.
What the Fed does is use these offshore dollar swap lines to effectively turn the Bank of Japan into an extension of the Fed’s discount window. So if you’re a Japanese bank facing funding problems because the Eurodollar market won’t supply the dollars you need, you go to the BOJ. The BOJ doesn’t need to sell Treasuries.
They can simply apply on your behalf to borrow dollars from the New York Fed via the swap line.
Why U.S. deficit levels are actually too low
In March and April 2020, the world faced a severe global dollar shortage. Immediately afterward, the U.S. government massively increased debt issuance through fiscal policy. While many expected the dollar to weaken, it instead remained strong—near historic highs. Behind this resilience was a massive shortage of collateral in the Eurodollar system.
Jeff:
In earlier times, you and I could transact in dollars because we knew each other. We had reputations. We trusted each other. So we could lend dollars without collateral. But as the Eurodollar system expanded, you’re now transacting in large-scale dollar deals with someone on the other side of the world.
How do you manage risk? One way is to say: “I don’t know you, Joy. But you need dollars, and I have them. If you can offer financial assets as collateral, we don’t need personal trust.”
I just need to know what the collateral is. If it’s standardized and widely accepted—like U.S. Treasuries—we can transact at massive scale. I lend you dollars, secured by a Treasury bond. If you default, I can seize and sell it the next day.
So collateral allowed the Eurodollar system to achieve unprecedented scale and reach. Consider the 1990s, when the U.S. government nearly ran a surplus—meaning a shortage of Treasuries available as collateral. Without enough Treasuries, we had to find alternatives.
Otherwise, you and I couldn’t do business—I don’t know you, I need security. So the monetary system—banks, the Eurodollar network—not only created new forms of money but also new forms of collateral. This partly explains the rise of securitization. My view on what happened in March 2020—actually April—is that we exited the crisis because the federal government issued trillions in Treasuries precisely when the market desperately needed collateral.
Joy: So it sounds like the U.S. government needs to maintain deficits to keep issuing Treasuries; otherwise, we’d have to rely on mortgage-backed bonds and other higher-risk instruments as collateral.
Jeff:
Exactly. That’s the perverse part: the more debt the federal government issues, the better the system functions. So you’re essentially rewarding the government’s worst fiscal behaviors.
This also explains why financial derivatives have exploded over the past 20 years. Their proliferation is directly linked to collateral shortages in the Eurodollar system.
Risks of CRE CLOs in the Eurodollar system
In previous videos, I mentioned how many lenders now heavily trade financial derivatives based on commercial real estate debt contracts—specifically CRE CLOs (Commercial Real Estate Collateralized Loan Obligations). These products aren’t just traded within the U.S.; they’ve become significant derivatives circulating in the Eurodollar market.
Jeff:
Several things are happening here. On one hand, you're right—there are indeed opacities in commercial real estate structures, and we lack sufficient transparency. But we keep hearing reports, especially from CLO sponsors, that they’re trying to limit losses, and they’re increasingly worried that if they start recognizing these losses, markets could spiral into chaos—echoing 2007, when the collapse of subprime mortgage bonds triggered a collateral shortage.
As those bonds became illiquid, their acceptability as collateral declined. Because if I lend you cash and take your bond as collateral, I don’t care about the bond’s credit quality—I only care whether I can sell it quickly the next day and recover my money. So even if you offer the highest-quality bond, if the underlying market becomes unstable and unreliable, I won’t accept it as collateral, because I can’t guarantee timely sale at the needed price.
So if the CLO market becomes illiquid, it means these CLOs—especially those backed by commercial real estate—are becoming less available as collateral, including for cash lending.
I’ve talked before about swapping high-risk assets for U.S. Treasuries, then using Treasuries as collateral to borrow more. This gets complicated. The Eurodollar system itself is like Frankenstein’s monster—cobbled together from many pieces. Over the years, it’s become so incredibly complex and opaque that almost no one truly understands how it works—or how it holds together—even the people operating within it.
So there’s always this risk: information asymmetry and uncertainty can become larger than the actual risks. I don’t want to say “need,” but that’s essentially what we’re talking about.
As the commercial real estate bubble bursts, we won’t get much information or logical pricing. More people will worry about whether to exit positions. More may sell, but without reliable data.
This makes markets less liquid and less trustworthy. It reduces the amount and usefulness of collateral. Then you fall into a full-blown collateral crunch—and all the other cascading problems.
On the other hand, we must also remember that CLOs, especially in recent years, have attracted high bids—mainly from Japan.
Japanese institutions have been squeezed by higher dollar-denominated funding costs. They’ve been buying riskier assets—particularly high-risk CLOs—to chase yield, trying to create positive carry to sustain their operations.
They’ve been compressing rate spreads, making these trades appear less risky than they are. But this could become more dangerous, creating a host of truly terrible possibilities.
If Japanese buyers—the heaviest investors in the CLO market—start realizing their assumptions for buying CLOs were wrong, they may stop bidding, accelerating CLO price declines, leading to far worse liquidity problems than otherwise.
(The interview was recorded in mid-July; by early August, Japan’s stock market crash had already materialized.)
Summary
To summarize: At the beginning of this episode, we noted that Eurodollars refer to U.S. dollars outside the United States. The dollar became the world’s dominant transaction currency not only because the U.S. has been the leading economic power since the last century, but also because globalization made the dollar the most widely available and functionally valuable medium globally—this is the deeper meaning of “reserve currency.” Looking back, the formation of the Eurodollar system was ironically propelled by the Soviet Union.
The current method by which the Fed influences dollar prices—adjusting interbank lending rates—only began during the U.S. inflation crisis of the 1970s. Although the Fed proactively establishes swap lines to alleviate global dollar shortages, the outcomes still fail to prevent volatility in financial and real economies.
Although the Eurodollar system contains virtually no physical dollars, from a financial standpoint, to keep the globalized economy running, U.S. Treasury bonds—issued by the engine of the global economy—have become the most recognized, valuable, and stable form of collateral. Thus, a paradox emerges: while many believe high U.S. government debt undermines dollar credibility, the Eurodollar system actually depends on continued U.S. deficit expansion to function smoothly. Otherwise, Eurodollar participants would have to resort to riskier dollar-denominated derivative debts as collateral—CRE CLOs being a prime example.
An interesting phenomenon emerges: the U.S. dollar and offshore dollars operate in two overlapping yet relatively independent systems. While we observe dollar movements affecting the world, it’s less accurate to say the U.S. controls the world via the dollar, and more precise to say it’s a case of mutual dependence. For example, China has attempted to promote the RMB as an alternative, but global confidence in the RMB as a value-measurement medium remains far below that of the dollar.
This isn’t to say the dollar or the Eurodollar system is flawless—it has many flaws and can’t last forever. But under current conditions, we must acknowledge: there is no viable alternative to the dollar in global trade and finance.
Understanding the mechanics of the Eurodollar and the broader field of macroeconomics isn’t just theoretical. Macroeconomics is an intersection of social systems, human behavior, politics, psychology, and more. Grasping macroeconomics helps us better understand how the world operates, clarifies our position within the global economy, reveals global trends, and traces the flow of money—all of which provide clearer guidance in making critical decisions about lifestyle, career paths, and investment choices.
After all, we must first understand the rules of the game to play it effectively.
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