Former CSRC Department Director Yao Qian: Received 2,000 Ether in a single bribe, valued at over 60 million yuan at one point; four-layer transaction tracing confirmed cryptocurrency dealer transferred 10 million yuan to his "burner account"
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Former CSRC Department Director Yao Qian: Received 2,000 Ether in a single bribe, valued at over 60 million yuan at one point; four-layer transaction tracing confirmed cryptocurrency dealer transferred 10 million yuan to his "burner account"
Under the high-pressure campaign against corruption, all forms of corrupt behavior have no place to hide.
Navigating Web3 tides with focused insightsOriginal article by: Red Star News
The fourth episode of the television documentary "Unceasing Steps, Not a Single Step Back," titled "Technology Empowers Anti-Corruption," co-produced by the Publicity Department of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission and China Central Television (CCTV), aired at 8 p.m. on January 14 on CCTV's comprehensive channel, with simultaneous release on CCTV News' new media platforms.
Besides spatial separation between domestic and overseas regions, online and offline physical isolation has also become a method current corrupt officials use to conceal their misconduct. Gold, cash, and valuable items are traditional mediums commonly seen in corruption cases; however, with the advent of the digital era and continuous development of virtual currencies based on blockchain technology, new forms of corruption have emerged that must be vigilantly guarded against.
These are key pieces of evidence seized in a disciplinary violation and illegal case involving a leading cadre. Some look like mobile phones, others resemble USB drives or remote controls. In fact, they are different models of hardware wallets used to store and manage virtual currencies. The three seemingly insignificant small "wallets" contain virtual currencies valued at tens of millions of RMB. Those who accepted bribes this way once harbored侥幸, believing their actions were sufficiently concealed.
Yao Qian, former Director of the Technology Regulation Department of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC): Honestly speaking, I knew this was a covert act—how could I possibly do it? I just thought before that there would hardly be any evidence.
Yao Qian, former director of the Technology Regulation Department and former director of the Information Center of the CSRC, previously served as director of the People's Bank of China's Digital Currency Research Institute. He was placed under investigation in April 2024. A special task force composed of personnel from the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision stationed at the CSRC under the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission, together with the Shanwei City Supervisory Commission of Guangdong Province, handled this case. From the outset, the task force conducted in-depth analysis based on Yao Qian’s personal characteristics.
Zou Rong, staff member of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision stationed at the CSRC under the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission: When supervising someone, we need to build a profile. Given his extensive work experience in digital currency, could there possibly be issues behind this involving using virtual currencies for quid pro quo transactions? In anti-corruption practices within capital markets, new types and hidden forms of corruption are particularly prominent.
As the investigation deepened, the initial assumptions made by the task force were confirmed: several large-scale illicit transactions carried out by Yao Qian employed novel and concealed methods of corruption, including accepting virtual currencies as bribes. Virtual currencies exist only as strings of numbers on networks, not only detached from their holders’ identities but also completely isolated from commercial banks and payment institutions. They can freely trade on blockchains and transfer across borders without geographical limitations, making them extremely covert and difficult to regulate. However, the task force had prepared thoroughly from the beginning, studying vast amounts of professional knowledge and gaining an in-depth understanding of how virtual currencies operate, thus identifying critical points for investigation.
Zou Rong: Holders mainly rely on private keys to control virtual currencies on blockchain addresses. This private key consists of a string of dozens of characters, which is inconvenient to memorize, so people generally use hardware wallets to safeguard them.
Cai Kunding, staff member of the Shanwei City Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision, Guangdong Province: During searches, two items are crucial: first, whether there are hardware wallets; second, whether there are slips of paper containing seemingly random mnemonic phrases. These are vital during searches.
Sure enough, the task force discovered hardware wallets inside a drawer in Yao Qian’s office. Meanwhile, strictly following regulations and discipline, the task force fully utilized big data and information technology to conduct comprehensive screenings of relevant information about Yao Qian, uncovering related traces. While Yao Qian’s own bank accounts showed no obvious abnormalities upon legal inquiry, cross-referencing through big data revealed several bank accounts opened under other individuals’ identities were actually “dummy accounts” controlled by Yao Qian. Tracing the source of large inflows and outflows in these dummy accounts led to a major discovery—a 10 million RMB transaction traced back to its origin.
Zou Rong: We found during preliminary verification that 10 million RMB of abnormal funds flowed into Yao Qian’s account. After approximately four layers of tracing, we ultimately confirmed that it originated from a capital account belonging to a virtual currency trader.
The investigation found that shortly after the 10 million RMB entered Yao Qian’s dummy account, it was used to pay part of the purchase price for a villa in Beijing. This villa, priced over 20 million RMB, was registered under the name of one of Yao Qian’s relatives but was actually owned by Yao Qian, with all purchase funds coming from his dummy accounts. Besides this 10 million RMB, another two large deposits totaling 12 million RMB were also used toward the property payment. Tracing the origins of this 12 million RMB revealed similarly complex and unusual pathways.
Shi Changping, staff member of the Shanwei City Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision, Guangdong Province: He believed that layering defenses would provide greater insulation. But conversely, more people and stronger evidence will eventually prove the existence of such problems.
The task force penetrated through multiple layers of deception, conducting thorough investigations and gathering evidence to lock down the source of the 12 million RMB. All this money came from an information services company controlled by businessman Wang Mou. Further investigation revealed that Yao Qian abused his power to assist this company in providing technological services in the securities and futures industry, forming a complete chain of evidence for the 12 million RMB in illicit benefits transferred.
Wang Mou further disclosed a key intermediary named Jiang Guoqing in this quid pro quo transaction—an employee subordinate to Yao Qian and very close to him. The task force promptly placed Jiang Guoqing under detention. Investigation showed he participated in nearly every major illicit transaction involving Yao Qian, especially when Yao received virtual currency bribes, with Jiang involved throughout.
Involved party Jiang Guoqing: Originally, I intended to pass it directly, but later reconsidered because I feared trouble, so I set up an intermediate address. Others sent the coins to this intermediate address, which then forwarded them to Yao Qian’s personal wallet. I knew this was benefit transfer—I was afraid, and I knew it was wrong.
Jiang Guoqing followed Yao Qian successively into the People's Bank of China's Digital Currency Research Institute and the CSRC's Technology Department. He was both a trusted aide and a pawn in Yao Qian’s path of corruption. Many businesspeople engaging in quid pro quo transactions with Yao Qian were introduced or conveyed requests via Jiang Guoqing, who also took a cut himself.
In 2018, a cryptocurrency entrepreneur named Zhang Mou sought Yao Qian’s help through Jiang Guoqing for a token issuance financing project. Yao Qian contacted a virtual currency exchange on Zhang’s behalf, helping his company successfully issue tokens and raise 20,000 ETH (Ethereum). Subsequently, Zhang gifted Yao Qian 2,000 ETH as a reward. At peak valuation, these ETH were worth over 60 million RMB. Yao Qian’s influence clearly stemmed from his official position.
Jiang Guoqing: Yao Qian held great influence in the industry due to his position.
To further solidify the evidence chain, the task force leveraged the characteristics of virtual currencies, attempting to reconstruct the entire flow process of Yao Qian receiving virtual currency bribes on the blockchain.
Zou Rong: Virtual currencies are covert, yet they are double-edged swords—they possess duality—because they also feature full-network transparency and traceability. That means anyone can check the inflow and outflow records of any blockchain address at any time, determined by the decentralized nature of blockchain, hence their public aspect.
Using blockchain technology, the task force successfully traced the flow of 2,000 ETH from Zhang’s wallet address to Yao Qian’s wallet address in 2018, and also retrieved complete records of Yao Qian transferring out 370 ETH in 2021, which were exchanged for 10 million RMB. The task force legally collected electronic evidence, achieving mutual corroboration among various pieces of evidence and forming a closed loop. Faced with such robust evidence, Yao Qian had no choice but to admit his violations and illegal acts.
In November 2024, Yao Qian was expelled from the Party and dismissed from public office, and transferred to procuratorial organs for legal prosecution. The successful handling of this case provided valuable experience for disciplinary inspection and supervision agencies in investigating bribery cases involving virtual currencies. Though virtual currencies appear formless and shadowy, once attempts are made to use them in the real world, they cannot remain virtual—they inevitably leave traces somewhere. The villa purchased by Yao Qian became the “developer” exposing him. Despite painstaking efforts to create intricate deceptions, he ultimately could not escape being pierced through. When Yao Qian was detained, the villa’s interior decoration remained unfinished—he would never get to live in it.
Zou Rong: Virtual currencies are useless if never cashed out—they’re just strings of numbers. When virtual assets transform into real assets, they easily become exposed.
Using virtual currencies to conceal illicit gains is merely one form of new and hidden corruption. Under sustained high-pressure anti-corruption efforts, regardless of how creatively or covertly corrupt methods evolve, as long as we firmly grasp the essential characteristic of quid pro quo transactions, strictly abide by rules and laws, fully utilize big data and other information technologies, strengthen identification and investigation capabilities, and continuously enrich effective prevention and control measures, no form of corruption can escape detection.
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