
Why Does BlackRock Care About the MEV Acquittal? A Trial Where the “Sandwich Attacker” Gets Sandwiched

Author: Daii, Crypto Reference
The $25 million on-chain counterattack ultimately hinged on an age-old legal question: what promises were made to whom? Understanding this is key to determining what the acquittal actually protects, and which on-chain behaviors it does not absolve. (Southern District of New York Federal Court ruling, November 16, BlackRock Staked Ethereum Fund prospectus)
Suppose you are buying something at a small store, and someone spots your order first, buys it preemptively, and then resells it to you at a slightly higher price. This front-runner makes a living daily by monitoring others' orders. One day, they spot a familiar large order, buy in as usual, only to find that the order didn't execute as expected; the goods remain in their hands, while the real money goes to the other party. This dispute on Ethereum in 2023 unfolded with similar drama. But the court's question was not about who was more likable—it was whether that order, that signature, actually constituted a legally actionable false promise. (Court ruling, pp. 11–16, 34–39)
On November 16, a U.S. federal judge acquitted Anton and James Peraire-Bueno. BlackRock had previously included their criminal case in the prospectus for its staked Ethereum fund: if MEV is ultimately deemed illegal, the fund’s staking operations could be disrupted. Why would a dispute between on-chain trading bots end up in a Wall Street fund’s risk disclosures? The answer lies in an Ethereum block proposal: the network currently enters a new slot every 12 seconds, but not every slot produces a block. (Court ruling, pp. 1, 4–5, BlackRock Staked Ethereum Fund prospectus, “MEV” risk paragraph, Ethereum official block proposal documentation)
Know the Person Who Earns Money by “Waiting in Line”
Ethereum transactions are not mechanically recorded in the exact order buttons are clicked. Transactions must first enter the pending queue before being placed into a block; the sequencing directly impacts prices on decentralized exchanges. MEV, or Maximum Extractable Value, refers to the additional value participants extract by including, excluding, and ordering transactions. It takes various forms such as arbitrage and liquidation, and not all MEV can be classified as attacks. One of the most controversial forms is the “sandwich attack”: a bot sees your buy order, buys ahead to push the price up, forces your trade to execute at a worse price, and then sells afterward to lock in profit. Regular traders bear the higher execution costs. (Court ruling, pp. 4–5, 11–12, Ethereum Foundation MEV documentation)
Today, professional bots typically hand over execution bundles (“buy first, sandwich the target trade, then sell”) to block builders, which are then routed via MEV-Boost relays to validators responsible for proposing blocks. Think of it like a sealed program schedule: the validator first sees the cover—the block header—and once signed, the relay unveils the full content. This design lets builders compete on bids while preventing validators from copying another builder’s sorting strategy before payment or commitment. The bots originally assumed that as long as the entire bundle entered the same block in the predetermined sequence, the tokens they bought would be sold immediately, eliminating long-term holding risk. (Court ruling, pp. 7–12, Flashbots MEV-Boost documentation)
For a deeper understanding of the everyday trading scenarios and mechanics of MEV attacks, I previously wrote this article on MEV attacks. The key distinction here is that the three professional traders labeled as “victims” in this case actually operate bots searching for sandwich opportunities themselves; their losses do not mean that ordinary users they previously sandwiched went unharmed. (Court ruling, pp. 11–13)
How the Brothers Lured Sandwich Bots into Their Trap
Court records show that starting in late 2022, the brothers studied the behavior of targeted bots, ran 16 validators, and repeatedly tested which types of transactions would attract them. On April 2, 2023, when one of their controlled validators was due to propose a block, they planted eight “decoy trades” in the public pending queue. The bots identified these as juicy sandwich targets and submitted bundles containing their own buys, the decoy trades, and their subsequent sells. The prosecution’s initial indictment described the entire process as netting roughly $25 million within about 12 seconds; however, this figure and narrative come from the state’s perspective, not an independent civil accounting by the judge for each individual loss. (Court ruling, pp. 12–15, U.S. Department of Justice indictment, pp. 8–11)
First, consider what the relay actually holds. Block builders submit a complete list of yet-to-be-published transactions; initially, validators only see the block header without transaction data and can access the list only after signing. The header contains two mandatory “fingerprints” that must be correct: the parent block root indicates which previous block the new one chains onto, and the state root reflects the on-chain state at that moment. An error in either renders the entire block invalid on Ethereum. A signature merely proves who signed that block header; it does not certify that the header was filled out correctly. If the relay hands over the transaction list before verifying the block’s validity, the validator gets a chance to review others’ transactions and rewrite their own block. (Court ruling, pp. 7–10, Flashbots incident post-mortem)
The vulnerability sat precisely at this gate. The open-source software used by the implicated Ultrasound relay verified that the signature came from the validator scheduled to propose the block and checked for field existence, but it did not validate whether the parent block root and state root values were correct. Even if the relay later attempted to publish the block and was rejected by Ethereum nodes, the program would still forward the complete transaction contents to the validator. Flashbots’ post-mortem attributed this to a relay implementation flaw; public records do not explain why developers omitted the validity check, so we cannot arbitrarily blame it on “speed optimizations” or “deliberate allowances.” (Court ruling, pp. 8–10, 14–16, 38–39, Flashbots incident post-mortem)
The brothers then zeroed out these two fields—which should have served as specific fingerprints—and signed them with their actual private keys. The signature passed verification because it genuinely corresponded to this “zero-filled block header”; however, this header describes an invalid block that genuine Ethereum nodes will reject. The relay, nevertheless, handed over the sealed transaction list first. The primary purpose of zeroing these fields was to use a valid signature to gain access to private content while simultaneously preventing the original block from being chain-committed. There was no impersonation of another party’s private key here; the so-called “fake signature” simply referred to signing a block header populated with incorrect data. (Court ruling, pp. 14–16, 36–39, Flashbots incident post-mortem)
The second purpose was eliminating competition. Once the original block was rejected, it could no longer compete for the same slot against the brothers’ subsequently submitted valid block. Having already seen the bots’ buy-sell arrangements, they retained the bots’ initial buys, swapped in their own sell transactions, and prevented the bots’ final sells from executing as planned. The brothers’ validators were slashed 1 ETH for proposing two blocks in the same slot; court records note trader losses of approximately $25 million. Following the incident, Flashbots updated the relay software: if an original block fails to publish successfully, transaction contents are withheld from the validator. (Court ruling, pp. 15–17, Flashbots post-mortem and fix, Flashbots fix code)
A striking quantitative example emerged during trial: one bot operator stated that their algorithm once offered roughly $2.3 million in USDC to acquire SHIB, which was worth only about $8.25 at the time, because the logic expected to immediately sell back at a more favorable rate. This was not a standard long-term SHIB investment anyone would hold; it was an instantaneous trade predicated on the premise that “the subsequent steps would execute fully.” This illustrates that once bundled transactions are unbundled, seemingly minor spread profits can instantly morph into massive exposure. (Court ruling, p. 12)
In May 2024, U.S. prosecutors charged the brothers with wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, arguing that the decoys, invalid block headers, and subsequent fund movements constituted a scam. After nearly four weeks of trial, proceedings ended in a mistrial in 2025 when the jury deadlocked. On November 16, 2026, after reviewing trial evidence, the judge granted a motion for acquittal and dismissed the case; this is a judicial decision based on insufficient evidence, not a jury verdict declaring the entire strategy legitimate. (U.S. Department of Justice 2024 press release, Court ruling, pp. 1, 45–46)
The Judge Asked Not “How Much Was Lost,” But “Where the Lie Was”
Prosecutors advanced two core lines alleging deception. First, the decoy trades ostensibly promised the bots they would be sandwiched and included in the final block as planned. The judge rejected this: a transaction appearing in a public queue merely states “I intend to execute this trade”; it makes no promise to be sandwiched, nor does it guarantee inclusion in any specific bundle. Profit spreads that bots hope to capture do not automatically contractually obligate the decoy deployer. Especially on an open network lacking unified terms of service, market participants’ expectations cannot be retroactively construed as explicit assurances made by their counterparts. (Court ruling, pp. 28–35)
Second, prosecutors argued that signing the block header equaled a promise to publish the full block unaltered. The judge again found this unpersuasive: under the mechanism at the time, the signature simply identified which validator acted, exposing them to slashing for misconduct; it did not guarantee the block would be valid or chain-accepted. More critically, the relay never inspected those two zeroed-out fields; since the receiver’s approval did not hinge on the fields’ accuracy, the prosecution struggled to prove these erroneous values constituted “material misrepresentations” inducing disclosure. A vulnerability was indeed exploited, and $25 million-level funds were certainly entangled, but wire fraud still requires proving specific statutory elements. (Court ruling, pp. 36–40)
Prosecutors also attempted to stitch together a series of covert actions to argue the overall conduct constituted a scam. The judge acknowledged the trading strategy might be distasteful, but ruled that hiding strategies, exploiting software flaws, and executing complex post-trade transfers cannot substitute for the material misrepresentation required by wire fraud statutes. The conspiracy to commit money laundering charge similarly relied on proceeds of wire fraud; with that foundational element failing, the latter charge collapsed. The opening of the ruling explicitly drew boundaries: it does not adjudicate moral righteousness, nor does it address other uncharged offenses or civil disputes. (Court ruling, pp. 1, 40–46)
The value of this acquittal first draws a testable line in criminal law: massive on-chain losses cannot justify bypassing the proof that “whom the defendant made what misrepresentation to, and whether they altered their conduct accordingly.” It also reminds protocol designers that economic penalties, code conventions, and legal commitments are three entirely different things. If a critical step must be trustworthy, software should verify it; if an action must be contractually binding, clear, provably accepted terms should be written. Acquittal does not equal “all MEV is legal”; it simply means this particular prosecutorial theory and evidentiary record failed to cross the threshold for criminal conviction. (Court ruling, pp. 28–46)
What BlackRock Cares About Is That Returns Flow Through the Same “Sorting Pipeline”
BlackRock’s iShares Staked Ethereum Trust ETF does not hand fund assets to these brothers. Instead, it enables service providers to use the fund’s ETH to participate in validation, earning protocol rewards, transaction tips, and potential MEV yields. The prospectus notes that staking providers will incorporate MEV into revenue streams; if MEV is determined to violate applicable laws, the fund’s staking program could be disrupted, potentially affecting share value. The document further projects that approximately 70% to 95% of ETH will be staked under normal conditions, disclosing that sponsors and service chains collectively take 18% of gross staking yields, with the remainder retained in the fund. Yields do not appear out of thin air: block sequencing carries a price, and the fund actively participates in capturing that portion. (BlackRock Staked Ethereum Fund March 2026 prospectus, “MEV”, staking arrangements and yield distribution paragraphs)
Concepts must not be conflated here. BlackRock’s filings refer to MEV-related compensation received by validators, not claim that the fund operates sandwich bots itself, let alone implies participation in the specific relay-vulnerability exploitation central to this case. MEV stems from diverse trading arrangements; within a single revenue pipeline, there may be publicly auctioned sequencing income alongside sandwich-driven slippage shifts burdened onto retail users. The court did not categorize them individually, nor did it issue a “license to operate” for the entire industry. For the fund, this acquittal mitigates the threat of the broadest criminal interpretations, but it does not eliminate regulatory, contractual, reputational, and strategy-specific legal risks. (BlackRock prospectus, “MEV” risk paragraph, Court ruling, pp. 1, 45–46)
Another layer of BlackRock’s maneuvering is particularly telling: its staking agreement mandates that Coinbase establish legally binding arrangements with validators, requiring them to commit to implementing AML controls, sanction address screening, and periodic testing; upon validator default, the fund can demand Coinbase pursue liability. This stands in stark contrast to this case: prosecutors failed to prove that the implicated validators accepted a concrete promise to “publish the block exactly as signed,” whereas the fund actively strives to codify key obligations into contracts within its operational chain. Contracts, too, cannot guarantee absolute security; the prospectus explicitly acknowledges that fund failure by Coinbase and validators, collection costs, and staking losses may still fall on the fund and its holders. (BlackRock prospectus, “Staking Addendum” and “Approved Validator Schedule” clauses)
After the Acquittal, the Real Question Is Who Bears the Sequencing Cost
This case leaves readers with a more practical analytical framework. When encountering “staking yields,” first ask whether income derives from protocol issuances or voluntary priority fees paid by traders, versus worse execution prices absorbed by others; second, inquire how yields distribute across funds, custodians, and node operators; finally, determine what recourse exists if sequencers breach promises—relying on on-chain penalties, software validation, or enforceable contractual remedies. BlackRock’s documents at least translate MEV revenues, the 18% fee split, and provider obligations into auditable text, though this remains insufficient to tell investors which exact trading strategies generate each tranche of MEV. (BlackRock prospectus, “MEV”, yield distribution and staking service terms)
For typical on-chain traders, the most direct lesson is not to emulate the brothers’ tactics. Before trading, check slippage limits, price impact, and execution paths; where necessary, employ transaction protections that reduce exposure in the public pending queue. Yet “private submission” still relies on service providers’ confidentiality and execution promises, and cannot serve as a zero-risk guarantee. For protocols and institutions, more critical steps involve validating the complete data bound to signatures, clearly defining obligations between block builders and validators, and documenting who accepts which rules. Markets may ultimately rely on code hardening, contractual gap-filling, or new regulatory boundaries; this ruling simply warns us that criminal law cannot single-handedly compensate for every missing design element. (Court ruling, pp. 7–12, 36–46, Ethereum Foundation MEV documentation, BlackRock prospectus staking service terms)
This is why BlackRock views this case as significant, and why the acquittal warrants close reading by all on-chain participants: an apparent $25 million squabble between mere bots has effectively elevated “transaction sequencing rights” from technical minutiae to legal and investor ledgers. The court delivered not a moral pardon for MEV, but rather a burdens-of-proof exercise: losses do not equate to fraud; profits do not equate to cost-free gains. What truly dictates the industry’s next direction is the ability to transparently document revenue sources, technical validations, and liability assignments. (Court ruling, pp. 1, 36–46, BlackRock prospectus MEV risks and staking agreements)














