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Bolivia "Can't Buy" USD, El Dorado Uses Stablecoins to "Secretly Tap Into" SWIFT

Bolivia "Can't Buy" USD, El Dorado Uses Stablecoins to "Secretly Tap Into" SWIFT

2026.09.10
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Banks are reluctant to sell US dollars, and importers rely on stablecoin channels to pay Chinese suppliers.

Written by Boaz Sobrado, Forbes

Translated by AididiaoJP, Foresight News

Bolivians struggle to buy US dollars at bank counters. It is not that they lack demand; banks are out of stock or reserve hard currencies for a select few large clients. Medium and small importers needing to pay Chinese factories find themselves blocked at the SWIFT checkpoint: some banks refuse the business, while others levy exorbitant fees. This Forbes report takes a sharp angle—since physical dollars are unavailable, a new bank is selling them cross-border wire transfer capabilities instead.

The company is called El Dorado. Founder and CEO Guillermo Goncalves tells reporters this is not another tale of "young people using an app to manage their pocket money," but rather a guide on how importers can route payments abroad when banks ration dollars. His strategy is straightforward: do not go head-to-head with Nubank or Wise in the consumer neobank race; target the B2B sector that traditional banks neglect.

The Fixed Exchange Rate, Tethered for Fifteen Years, Finally Became Just a Number on the Wall

Since 2011, Bolivia had pegged its official exchange rate to approximately 6.86 bolivianos for buying and 6.96 for selling one US dollar, maintaining the anchor for fifteen years. Following a downturn in natural gas exports, foreign exchange reserves were depleted. Reports indicate that net international reserves dipped to around $30 million by mid-2025. With banks unable to supply dollars, a parallel market emerged. Street rates approached 20 bolivianos per dollar. Premiums for stablecoins over the official rate reached 70.5% in the Q4 2025 index. This was not crypto speculation; it was the market's evasion price once official channels failed to deliver dollars.

On June 26, 2026, the government abandoned the peg in favor of a floating rate. The central bank website subsequently updated the official rate to approximately 9.73, representing a roughly 30% devaluation from the original buying rate. Market reference prices quickly converged near 9.90. Being able to exchange currency did not mean physical US dollars suddenly appeared at teller windows. Cross-border payments, trade financing, and syndicated loans remained constrained. Regulators later permitted banks to partially link their international remittance fees to parallel market prices. In April 2026, Bolivia's financial regulator ASFI set commission bands for large outbound remittances at 5% to 10%, with caps reaching up to 20% for other large foreign-currency remittances. Goncalves elaborated at an industry conference: a handful of banks capable of processing SWIFT messages look down on medium and small clients; when they do accept the business, a single wire transfer can cost 5%.

Importers do not need theoretical exchange rates; they need funds that can actually be sent out. When banks fail to deliver, shipments stall. A Brazilian subsidiary of US parts manufacturer Dana encountered this exact scenario: Bolivian customers could not pay in dollars, switching to euros proved cumbersome, and they ultimately used a licensed money changer to convert to USDC, which banks then settled into USD accounts. Here, stablecoins are not speculative vehicles; they are conduits for exporting bolivianos. What the recipient actually receives remains dollars.

El Dorado Sells Not Cash, But Accounts Capable of Sending SWIFT Messages

Built by Latin American founders who came of age amid persistent inflation, El Dorado began as a peer-to-peer stablecoin market before evolving into a super-app featuring smart wallets, P2P trading, and local payment rails. Users convert bolivianos, Argentine pesos, Brazilian reals, or Colombian pesos into USDT or USDC to spend domestically or remit to family. Goncalves refers to the underlying architecture as a "stablecoin sandwich"—local real-time payments on both ends bridged by stablecoins, completing transactions in minutes. The interface mirrors Wise or Western Union, sparing users from having to understand the on-chain liquidity operating behind the scenes.

This consumer-side vertical has already gained tangible traction in Bolivia. The company claims it ranks between fifth and tenth in local fintech app download charts, competing against entrenched domestic banks. In April 2026, Goncalves personally visited Santa Cruz to promote the product, with plans to establish an office in May. He praises a market willing to experiment with new solutions, setting a goal to enable people to "earn dollars, save dollars, and spend bolivianos."

Forbes focuses more intently on the other vertical. In June 2026, the company announced a $9 million Series A round led by Paradigm with participation from Coinbase Ventures, alongside the launch of its enterprise product, El Dorado Business. Companies can open USD-denominated accounts under their business name to send and receive SWIFT, ACH, and wire transfers, with official documentation stating wires cover over 120 countries. The architecture highlights multi-signature accounts, self-custody features, and virtual USD accounts. Goncalves is explicit: treasury funds can be held in stablecoins, but supplier payments will likely still route through SWIFT or traditional wires; only within the next one to two years will suppliers increasingly accept stablecoins directly.

This directly echoes the headline's core premise. Because Bolivians cannot buy dollars, this company sells them wire transfer capability. For importers, the key is not adding another token to a wallet; it is the ability to send payments directly to a Chinese factory's bank account in their own name.

Why He Believes B2B Is More Valuable Than Another Consumer Neobank

Goncalves estimates the Latin American cross-border payments market at nearly $1 trillion annually, with roughly 60% comprising corporate imports and exports. Channels from the US into Latin America are already saturated. He prioritizes regional corridors, particularly Brazil-Bolivia and Argentina-Bolivia routes. Nubank and Wise have not deeply penetrated markets like Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, or Peru. Large banks reserve SWIFT access for select corporate clients, leaving medium-sized importers largely unserved. That gap is exactly where he operates.

Company disclosures state coverage of approximately 12 countries, over 100,000 active users, and more than 5 million processed transactions, with roughly half involving cross-border flows. Other public statements suggest an even larger regional user base. Numbers vary by reporting methodology, but the trajectory is consistent—first connect local fiat with digital dollars via P2P, then integrate corporate accounts with traditional wire networks. Consumer neobanks compete for payroll processing, QR code scans, and savings accounts; Bolivia lacks a viable dollar channel for paying overseas suppliers. By concealing stablecoins in the backend and positioning SWIFT at the forefront, they are transforming neglected trailing-edge trade into a productized service.

Policies Have Swung 180 Degrees, But Liquidity Pipes Remain Tight

Bolivia previously maintained a near-total ban on cryptocurrencies, but attitudes shifted sharply following the foreign exchange crisis. Crypto ATMs now appear on streets, merchants accept Bitcoin or USDT, and Binance P2P has become a common workaround for everyday currency exchange. In 2025, authorities tightened declaration requirements for physical foreign currency entering or leaving the country. Stablecoins fill the void left by the banking system; they are not intended to replace the central bank nor to make the boliviano "usable" again. They simply ensure that import payments can still exit the country when official channels fail.

The risks are equally transparent. A dual-exchange-rate regime will not disappear simply because a new app exists. Capital controls, anti-money laundering regulations, and correspondent banking relationships can tighten without warning. While SWIFT gives the appearance of traditional banking, the backbone remains stablecoin liquidity and offshore accounts. Users purchase payment capability, not physical US dollars from a central bank counter. Corporate treasuries held in stablecoins must absorb spread costs, counterparty risk, and compliance reviews. Ordinary importers rarely see everything behind the scenes: who approves accounts, which blockchain processes the outflows, and which correspondent bank ultimately receives the funds.

Goncalves deliberately narrows the company's positioning: avoid competing with top-tier consumer neobanks for salary cards; instead, capture the import-export orders traditional banks disdain. Bolivians unable to buy dollars do not want another logo; they want a wire transfer that actually reaches a supplier's account. When official exchange rate anchors break down, what truly holds value is not retelling tales of "dollarization," but whoever can successfully move money across borders and ensure receiving banks honor it.

El Dorado conceals stablecoins in the back end and displays SWIFT at the front. That is precisely what this new bank is actually selling in this report.