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IOSG|Crypto Primary Investing: The Tug-of-War Between Human Nature, Law, and Capital

IOSG|Crypto Primary Investing: The Tug-of-War Between Human Nature, Law, and Capital

2026.11.19
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In the gray area between interests and trust, the law serves as the bottom-line defense, but institutional design is the solution to restraining human nature.

Author: IOSG Legal, IOSG Ventures

After years of deep involvement in the crypto industry and hundreds of project investments, our perspective on industry investment terms has evolved from initial confusion to acceptance, and now to reflection and questioning:

As project structures become increasingly complex and documents more highly professionalized, are we truly enhancing security, or merely making risk appear more respectable? When agreements are filled with governance clauses, can these rights actually be enforced, or are they mere paper tigers?

The systemic risks in Web3 investments often lie not in the market, but in the lack of accountability within the architecture itself. Beautiful documents and complete terminology mean little if, in the worst-case scenario, investors cannot identify the responsible party, constrain control rights, or access legal remedies. Fundamentally, this is not risk management, but risk packaging.

Three Recurring Structural Issues:

1. Excessive Separation of Entities:

Value, control, and liability are artificially decoupled. R&D/operations reside in one company, while token issuance and treasury management are handled by another entity (foundation / SPV), and investors may only sign with one of them.

On the surface, it resembles risk isolation; in reality, it is "risk without ownership": when things go wrong, everyone can claim "that wasn't me." Investors never truly feared decentralization; what they fear is de-responsibilization.

2. Symbolic Governance:

Documents exist without mechanisms; rights exist without teeth.

In the early days, verbal promises and gentlemen's agreements among investors (which today seem like wild-west cowboy adventures) evolved into SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrants, yet critical enforcement mechanisms remained absent.

Substantive consent rights for major decisions, budgeting and audit schedules for treasury expenditures, rules for replacing multi-signature signers, and the scope/boundaries of disclosure read like corporate governance, but operate like wish lists in practice.

3. Structurally Weakened Remedies:

Assets move faster than the law, entities change faster than procedures, and cross-border costs exceed potential compensation—these are why asserting rights in crypto investments is so difficult. For investors, true risk management isn't about drafting longer clauses, but ensuring the ability to "stop the bleeding," "recover assets," and "enforce judgments" in the worst-case scenario.

This industry has moved past its early "dark forest" era, yet sudden project collapses remain commonplace. There are two root causes: first, some founders lack reverence for contractual spirit; second, the industry suffers from a lack of structural memory, causing investors to repeatedly make the same mistakes in architectural design.

Through five real-world case scenarios, this article examines structural issues that are usually overlooked but can prove fatal in extreme situations, distilling battlefield lessons into actionable principles.

Case Study 1: From "Perfect Architecture" to the "Vanishing Defendant"

Keywords: Entity Separation, Legal Entity Existence

A few years ago, we engaged with a project dedicated to building blockchain gaming infrastructure. The team boasted a prestigious background and top-tier resumes, with their "one-click on-chain" solution directly addressing core pain points for traditional game publishers.

To facilitate fundraising and navigate complex global regulations, the project designed a widely accepted "perfect" offshore architecture at the time: registering a parent company in Delaware for R&D, while simultaneously establishing an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) in crypto-friendly Gibraltar specifically for token issuance.

Technology and teams in the US, tokens in an offshore SPV—the default consensus of the investment circle at the time.

Facing this structure, investors typically took two paths: traditional equity investors poured money into the parent company under the logic that controlling the team means controlling the project. We chose a more "Crypto Native" path: signing a Token Purchase Agreement directly with the Gibraltar SPV to exchange investment for future token rights.

Our rationale was straightforward: since tokens are the core asset of this ecosystem's future, securing direct token rights is more effective than equity. At the time, this seemed like a highly rational judgment.

Post-investment brought a relatively calm period. Project progress was slow but steady, and the team maintained polite and restrained communication with investors.

Then, one day, the Gibraltar SPV suddenly announced a CEO change without notifying the US parent company or any investors, almost synchronously unilaterally launching token issuance. Internal power struggles went public, market confidence instantly collapsed, and the coin price plummeted upon listing. Our "token rights" overnight transformed from potential value into highly volatile digital chips.

Our initial reaction was anger, but after cooling down, we quickly judged this as more of a leadership struggle within the founding team. The SPV management clearly attempted to break free from the parent company's control. Institutions holding parent company equity would inevitably take legal action, potentially steering the project back on track. We chose to wait and see.

As expected. The parent company and its underlying equity investors swiftly filed lawsuits in both the US and Gibraltar, winning their initial battles: they successfully obtained a temporary restraining order from a US court to restore the parent company's access to key technical infrastructure, and also secured an injunction from the Gibraltar court freezing most of the SPV's issued tokens. The parent side was poised to regain control.

Then, an entirely unexpected reversal occurred.

The Gibraltar court vacated the injunction. The reasoning was chillingly simple: the US parent company, having failed to submit a mandatory compliance document for over a year, had already been administratively dissolved by the Delaware state government more than a year earlier.

In a legal sense, this company no longer

existed

.

A company legally "dead" lacks the standing to sue anyone as a plaintiff. It possesses no legal personality, no capacity to hold rights, and no interests that a court could protect.

Those institutions invested in the parent company equity were completely shut out overnight. The legal entity backing their investment vanished, stripping away the foundation for all claims. Investment reduced to zero.

We who held SPV token rights saw our assets shrink drastically due to infighting, but at least still possessed tradable tokens. Meanwhile, those once deemed "safer" equity investors utterly lost their legal footing.

Rather than relief, that moment was defined by dread.

The most lethal risk in this industry may not be market crashes, tech vulnerabilities, or even founder character, but rather a forgotten compliance document costing only a few hundred dollars.

Case Conclusion

The continuity of Legal Due Diligence (Legal DD) is crucial.

The key to investment decisions lies not only in confirming at the moment of signing that the corporate entity is in "Good Standing," but in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism spanning the entire investment cycle. Ensuring every legal entity along the investment chain remains "alive" and compliant is the most fundamental baseline of investment management, yet it is frequently overlooked.

Investors must penetrate and understand actual control over offshore architectures.

When core assets (such as token issuance rights) are housed in an offshore SPV, and parent company control relies solely on a single agreement, investors must maintain high vigilance. Powerful covenants must be embedded in the investment agreement—for example: prohibiting changes to the SPV's directors or controllers without investor majority consent;

mandating the parent company maintain its lawful existence, triggering breach clauses otherwise; requiring investor-appointed director approval for any major decisions (such as a Token Launch). These clauses must be explicitly drafted upfront, not bolted on after problems arise.

Never blindly rely on lead investors.

Even the industry's top funds may have blind spots or undisclosed interest ties in their due diligence. Independent, cross-verified reference checks are indispensable. Investors must rely on their own independent judgment and take responsibility for their capital.

Case Study 2: The "Evaporation" of Value, Entity Switching, and Early Investor Dilution

Keywords: Entity Separation, Entity Switching Dilution

Another type of structural risk is far more insidious, often operating squarely within a "legal" framework.

In 2021, amidst market fervor, we invested in a technology firm specializing in Formal Verification. Composed of experts with top academic backgrounds, the team possessed robust technical capabilities, treated investors with consistent respect, and fostered harmonious relationships.

However, roughly two to three years later, we gradually discovered the founders were constructing an entirely new token issuance entity, intending to advance the token program under a vehicle completely separated from the original investment company. Even more unacceptable, this new entity offered no recognition to early equity investors nor made attempts to incorporate them into the new token equity framework.

From a legal standpoint, their maneuvers were technically impeccable: the new entity was independently registered, and original investment contracts did not directly bind the actions of this new subject.

Yet from a business logic perspective, this constituted a systematic deprivation of early investor value. Early investors fueled a team and technology with capital and trust, only for those resources to "sprout anew" within the new entity while the original equity structure was quietly hollowed out.

We subsequently represented all early investors in months-long arduous negotiations with the founders, arguing fiercely and insisting on rightful entitlements. Ultimately, we secured valuation terms for early investors more favorable than those granted to the new round. But this process nearly exhausted all relational capital accumulated with the founders.

This incident profoundly taught us:

Entity switching can be the most "elegant" method of value extraction.

Case Conclusion

Include "Entity Switch Protection Clauses" in investment agreements.

Explicitly stipulate: If founders establish new affiliated entities within a certain timeframe post-investment (recommended 2-3 years) and advance core asset (especially token) issuance, early investors shall receive corresponding equity shares. This clause should be integrated during initial investment, not retrofitted after issues arise.

Governance rights outweigh valuation metrics.

Board seats, the right to information and consent regarding major architectural changes, are the last line of defense protecting early investor interests. Trusting solely on relationships and trust is insufficient.

Case Study 3: When Humanity Becomes a Variable, Rescue Financing, and Broken Promises

Keywords: Structurally Weakened Remedies

If the previous cases were cold games of law and structure, this one is entangled with human nature and relationships. Sometimes, what breaks you isn't complex clauses, but a face that shifts rapidly when faced with financial interests.

This occurred at the deepest trough of a bear market. An early-stage project we invested in had depleted its capital and teetered on the brink of collapse. The founders pleaded earnestly, stating accounts were empty and operations couldn't continue without fresh capital injection.

Out of a desire to protect existing investments and cling to faint hopes for the project, we decided to intervene with rescue financing (a down-round) at a lower valuation. The founders expressed deep gratitude at the time.

Once funds cleared, the project survived. The market soon recovered, and the project's sector became hot. Leveraging this "lifeline" capital, the founders rode the market wave, supplemented by exceptional storytelling, ultimately securing follow-on investment from prominent institutions and successfully listing on major exchanges.

However, post-investment communication with the founders turned extraordinarily difficult. When investors demanded fulfillment of initial promises, they launched a series of deflections—from initially refusing to distribute tokens to investors despite Coinbase listing requirements, to delaying tactics citing personal or family illnesses. The entire stalling process spanned months.

The final standoff delivered an ultimatum: accept terms identical to other new investors, or drop it entirely. Initial goodwill from rescue financing was discarded in the face of substantial profit motives.

Luckily, our legal and post-investment teams never gave up. Through long-term, patient negotiation and rights assertion, we ultimately recovered the vast majority of entitled tokens. Yet this experience exposes a fundamental question:

Shifts in利益 structures systematically alter human behavior. This is not a pessimistic view of human nature, but a variable that should have been proactively designed into the contract structure from the start.

Case Conclusion

All commercial commitments, regardless of size, must be formalized into legally binding documents.

One must not relax demands on legal documentation just because the counterparty adopts a humble posture. Business decisions should always assume the worst-case scenario. Rescue financing during bear markets typically occurs during periods of maximum information asymmetry and emotional stress, which coincidentally happens when investors most easily relax legal standards. The more the counterparty's posture sinks and our negotiating leverage peaks, the more we must insist on embedding all promises into formal agreements.

Given the scarcity of contractual spirit, agreements must guarantee execution through designing "teeth-bearing" clauses:

Investment agreements must explicitly define liabilities for breach. For instance, failure to fulfill specific terms triggers penalty clauses, or grants investors the right to acquire additional tokens at heavily discounted prices. The cost of breach must significantly outweigh potential gains from betrayal.

Simultaneously, ensure investors possess sufficient bargaining chips, such as board seats, veto power on major matters, or joint control over corporate bank accounts and multi-signature wallets.

Before deciding on rescue, answer a fundamental question first:

What is the root cause of this team's funding crisis? Do their values withstand pressure testing? Insisting on transparency and compliance isn't a lack of trust in founders; it's the most basic protection for the relationship between both parties.

Case Study 4: Governance Absence, The Cost of Silence

Keywords: Symbolic Governance

There exists a category of risk stemming neither from legal structural loopholes nor intentional founder betrayal, but from investors themselves being absent at critical moments.

We once invested in a promising Web3 infrastructure project at the time. Backing the project was a major shareholder with considerable prestige and massive assets in the industry—one of our primary reasons for bullishness. However, during an all-hands meeting, this major shareholder publicly fired the CEO, leaving the entire team completely caught off guard.

We only learned of this afterward from the departing CEO himself, rather than through official project announcements.

At the time, we judged this as merely normal management turnover, not constituting an immediate crisis signal warranting intervention. We requested no audits, called for no special shareholder meetings, initiated no evaluation procedures, and chose silence and observation.

Roughly six months to a year later, the new management announced foundation liquidation. We ultimately recovered less than twenty percent of our initial investment.

Retrospectively, that abrupt CEO dismissal was the clearest early warning signal of the project's decline.

When companies undergo major abnormal management changes, it often signals deep fractures within the core governance structure. At that juncture, the most critical action for investors is to immediately demand independent audits and intervene in governance reconstruction, rather than standing idly by.

Case Conclusion

Categorize major governance events as mandatory "Intervention Triggers" (Trigger Events).

Investment agreements must specify: major events such as abnormal CEO departure, core shareholder changes, initiation of litigation or arbitration automatically trigger investor special rights, including demanding independent financial audits, convening special shareholder meetings, halting significant financial expenditures, etc.

Maintain continuous monitoring, not passive waiting.

Post-investment management shouldn't stop at routine quarterly updates. Investors need proactive information channels, including maintaining communication with core project employees (not just founders). We recommend requiring quarterly independent updates at the CFO/CTO level in post-investment agreements, rather than relying solely on the founder as a single channel.

Case Study 5: Halo of Resumes, Black Hole of Character

Keywords: Symbolic Governance, Structurally Weakened Remedies

The investment world often says, "It's all about betting on people." Yet, we are far too easily dazzled by glittering resumes. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, top hedge funds... these names carry inherent halos, subconsciously linking "elite backgrounds" with "professionalism, discipline, and reliability." But the harsh reality is that sometimes, the most dangerous figures are precisely these "golden boys."

Wall Street training equipped them to package narratives, exploit rules, and sway opinions. These abilities aren't inherently good or bad, but once misapplied, their destructive power vastly exceeds imagination.

We once "luckily" passed on a project. The founder's resume was flawless, climbing to executive roles at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan before striking out alone. His venture aimed to build an "absolutely fair" on-chain casino. The story was seductive, the team star-studded, prompting numerous well-known firms to fiercely compete for entry at the time.

However, due to our severe concerns over regulatory compliance risks associated with the "casino" vertical, after multiple unsuccessful discussions with the founders on compliance pathways, our risk control department ultimately vetoed the investment.

The plot twist arrived the very next day. The project announced raising millions in USD. Yet, within minutes of fund clearance, the founder began transferring company funds into his personal wallet. Over the following week, he gambled away millions of those dollars on another on-chain casino app.

Promising to build a fair casino, he instead used construction funds to gamble in others'. This isn't risk management failure; it's naked fraud and misappropriation. Ultimately, the FBI intervened, the founder was arrested, and faces years of imprisonment.

Another firsthand case involved a AAA game hailed as the "on-chain Call of Duty." While team members hailed from elite studios, burn rates were terrifyingly high at $2-3 million monthly, whereas development progress severely lagged. The company swiftly entered a financial crisis, downsizing staff from over a hundred to merely a handful.

Just as the edifice trembled, we discovered that the co-founder and CTO had continuously dumped his team tokens on secondary markets over seven months, cashing out nearly $700,000. Legally speaking, he was selling vested shares, seemingly beyond reproach.

Yet from a business ethics standpoint, with the company's life hanging by a thread and masses laid off, a core leader personally draining funds sends an unmistakable market signal: "The ship is sinking, jumping first."

In both cases, investors overly focused on founders' past halos while neglecting deep scrutiny of current character and behavioral patterns. Simultaneously, lacking key controls like "multi-signature" requirements and "milestone-based payments" directly led to loss of capital oversight.

Case Conclusion

Character Due Diligence (Character DD) must take absolute precedence.

Resumes can be polished, stories packaged, but an individual's character and behavioral patterns remain relatively stable. Investment firms must build more systematic Character DD methodologies, going beyond routine background checks to require deeper interviews and possibly behavioral pressure tests. Crucially, examine: does the founder's personal history fundamentally contradict their proclaimed project mission?

An individual with a gambling record entering the entertainment/casino space is itself a massive red flag.

Capital control is a non-negotiable investment baseline.

For early-stage projects, especially where founders dominate solo, absolutely no capital should reside in wallets solely controlled by individuals. Multi-sig wallets must be a mandatory requirement, with investors or their designated trusted third parties serving as co-signatories.

Fund disbursement should tie to clear, quantifiable milestones: task completed, funds released. These mature risk-control instruments from traditional VC must be strictly enforced in crypto.

Deeply align core team incentives with long-term project development.

Team token unlocks shouldn't merely track time, but heavily correlate with project milestones (e.g., product launch, user base scaling, protocol revenue thresholds). Concurrently, agreements must explicitly stipulate that core member token sales face restrictions during financial distress or major crises.

This acts as both constraint and gesture, signaling to the community and all investors the team's determination to rise and fall with the project.

Epilogue: Returning to Common Sense, Navigating Cycles

After enduring so much, we are far from those blood-boiling "Web3 believers." We've morphed into realists, risk assessors, observers of human nature. No longer easily swept up by grand narratives, we scrutinize every detail like auditors and stress-test every hypothesis like engineers.

Evaluating projects now compels us to repeatedly ask ourselves:

Do we truly know this founder? Beyond his own narratives, have we gathered intelligence from angles, ex-colleagues, former bosses, even competitors about what kind of person he really is?

Do we genuinely comprehend this project's legal architecture? Are hidden backdoors present? Should the founder abscond, does our contract serve as worthless paper or a sharp sword?

Post-funding, do we retain control over capital deployment? Or do we merely pin hopes on founders' moral consciousness?

Are founding team incentives truly perfectly aligned with ours? Do their token unlock mechanisms encourage long-term construction, or merely facilitate short-term exits?

When spotting early warning signs, do we have the courage to say no?

Ultimately, sound investment structures don't guard against gentlemen; they prepare for extreme scenarios. When everyone plays nicely, any architecture functions smoothly. The true test arrives when interests fracture, markets violently shift, and trust evaporates: does your contract speak for you?

We purchased these lessons with hard cash. We document them because we believe,

the price of industry advancement should not be repeatedly paid by each generation of newcomers.

And precisely for this reason, we have systematically embedded continuous compliance monitoring, entity switch protection clauses, and mandatory multi-sig wallet requirements into our investment processes. These aren't superficial improvements; they are institutional upgrades forged from repeated real-world costs.

This marks the inaugural submission of the IOSG-Legal series. We will continuously release industry practice guides henceforth, welcoming peer discussion and collaborative standard-setting. If you possess comparable practical experience, structural insights, or cautionary tales to share, contributions and exchanges are warmly invited.

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